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SMART CARS, TELEMATICS AND REPAIR
Leah Chan Grinvald & Ofer Tur-Sinai *

ABSTRACT
Recent years have seen a surge in the use of automotive telematics. Telematics
is the integration of telecommunications and informatics technologies. Using
telematics in cars enables transmission of data communications between the car
and other systems or devices. This opens up a wide range of possibilities, including
the prospect of conducting remote diagnostics based on real-time access to the
vehicle. Yet, as with any new technology, alongside its potential benefits, the use of
automotive telematics could also have potential downsides. This Article explores
the significant negative impact that the growing reliance on telematics systems
could have on competition in the market for repair services.
Our analysis highlights two main areas where the use of telematics for vehicle
diagnostics may pose a threat to competition and consumer choice. First, we focus
on the manner by which manufacturers communicate with their customers via the
telematics system. Due to the special relationship between car manufacturers and
their consumers, which is often based on trust and loyalty, alongside the “captive
audience” status of drivers, we argue that communications emanating from the
car’s telematics system could be deceptive. Second, we explore the negative impact
that the shift away from on-board diagnostics to telematics could have on
independent repair shops’ access to diagnostic information.
Fortunately, the law can adapt to keep pace with these new technological and
commercial developments. This Article articulates the combined multi-prong,
multi-agency policy approach needed to maintain an effective right to repair cars
in the new age of telematics. Among other things, our analysis supports an update
of state consumer protection legislation and an increased policing by the Federal
Trade Commission of practices employed by car manufacturers. In addition, we
highlight the need to consider certain amendments to intellectual property laws
that effectively aid car manufacturers in maintaining exclusive control over their
telematics systems and diagnostic data.
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INTRODUCTION
Imagine yourself driving your car home from work. Suddenly,
the “Check Engine” light on your dashboard turns on. A few seconds later, an authoritative voice emanating from the vehicle’s
speakers alerts you of a bad catalytic converter or a problem with
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one of the car’s oxygen sensors. It then continues to inform you of
the nearest authorized dealership, where the service department
can fix the problem. You can even use a click-to-call button installed on your dashboard that would put you in direct contact with
that dealership, enabling you to make an appointment right away.
What would you do?
It is safe to assume that in such a scenario, many people would
be inclined to fix their cars at the authorized dealership, if not
1
immediately, then at some later point. Yet, even if a consumer decides to take her car to her loyal, local garage rather than to the
dealership, there is no guarantee that the mechanic would be able
to diagnose and repair the problem, certainly not as efficiently as
2
the dealership could. This is, in large part, due to the fact that the
mechanic would not have access to the same diagnostic information that is available to the manufacturer and its authorized
3
dealerships in real time.
The scenario described above is not science fiction, but rather a
very plausible scenario, in light of major technological advances in
4
5
the field of car diagnostics and the growing connectivity of cars.
In recent years, the car industry has moved towards producing
“smarter” cars with telematics systems. “Telematics” is an emerging
interdisciplinary technological field, integrating telecommunica6
tions and informatics. Telematics systems employed in vehicles allow real-time information from the vehicle’s operating system, including diagnostic information, to be transmitted wirelessly. While

1. See Adrian Ma, Your Car Talks to the Manufacturer. Advocates Want It to Talk to You,
Too, WBUR: BOSTONOMIX (Aug. 6, 2019), https://www.wbur.org/bostonomix/2019/08/06
/right-to-repair-ballot-measure [https://perma.cc/8A6K-N9C7] (quoting Barry Steinberg,
an independent auto shop repair owner: “If Big Brother comes on in your car and says, ‘Go
to your Honda dealer,’ 90% of people are going to listen to them . . . .”).
2. See Sarah Kessler, The Connected Car of the Future Could Kill Off the Local Auto Repair
Shop, QUARTZ (Sept. 5, 2017), https://qz.com/1054261/the-connected-car-of-the-futurecould-kill-off-the-local-auto-repair-shop [https://perma.cc/2D3D-8YM3].
3. See id. (describing how some manufacturers are routing data through their own
servers).
4. See, e.g., Colin Pawsey, Advanced Automotive Diagnostics Systems—From Diagnostics to
Prognostics, AUTO. IQ (Nov. 13, 2018), https://www.automotive-iq.com/autonomous-drive
/articles/advanced-automotive-diagnostics-systems-from-diagnostics-to-prognostics
[https:
//perma.cc/7MBJ-VLLR] (describing developments in the field, “including the use of artificial intelligence and deep learning neural networks to develop advanced prognostic systems”).
5. See I. Wagner, Connected Cars – Statistics & Facts, STATISTA (Sept. 15, 2020), https:
//www.statista.com/topics/1918/connected-cars [https://perma.cc/V4LQ-YB8D] (projecting that out of the more than 1 billon cars used globally, sales of connected cars would hit
approximately 28.5 million in 2019).
6. See, e.g., Xiaoguang Tian, Victor R. Prybutok, Fouad H. Mirzaei & Catalin C.
Dinulescu, Millennials Acceptance of Insurance Telematics: An Integrative Empirical Study, 23 AM.
BUS. REV. 156, 158 (2020) (“Automotive telematics is described as the integration of telecommunications and informatics technologies applied to the transportation industry.”).
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the ability to obtain real-time diagnostic information about a car is
a positive development for car safety and possible vehicle longevity,
as with any new technology, there are some significant potential
downsides. This Article focuses on the potential negative effect of
7
the rise of telematics on competition in the market for car repairs.
Up until recently, diagnostic data generated by cars could generally be retrieved by connecting to a standard on-board diagnos8
tics port (OBD port). State law in Massachusetts and a nation-wide
memorandum of understanding (MOU) between major car manufacturers and the repair industry guaranteed consumers and independent repair shops the ability to access diagnostic information
9
available through the OBD port. With the switch to telematics sys10
tems, however, such access is currently at risk, as these systems are
not standardized across different car manufacturers, are typically

7. In this Article, we are focusing on the equilibrium among the various players in the
marketplace for vehicle repair. There are a multitude of other potential harms, including
privacy and cybersecurity, which we do not focus on in this piece. See, e.g., Andy Greenberg,
Hackers Remotely Kill a Jeep on the Highway—With Me in It, WIRED (July 21, 2015, 6:00 AM),
https://www.wired.com/2015/07/hackers-remotely-kill-jeep-highway
[https://perma.cc
/F6TZ-SDYF] (discussing the dangers of car hacking); Yossi Vardi, What to Expect from Car
Hackers in 2020 and Beyond, VENTUREBEAT (Dec. 22, 2019, 10:25 AM), https:
//venturebeat.com/2019/12/22/what-to-expect-from-car-hackers-in-2020-and-beyond
[https://perma.cc/FZX6-AU7J] (discussing the need for cybersecurity to proactively address the threat of car hacking); Geoffrey Fowler, Driving Surveillance: What Does Your Car
Know About You?, WASH. POST (Dec. 17, 2019, 7:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/technology/2019/12/17/what-does-your-car-know-about-you-we-hacked-chevy-find-out
[https://perma.cc/TM63-7G9L] (discussing the trove of data that cars can collect regarding
its drivers); Davey Winder, Your New Car Is a Hacker Magnet –– Automotive Industry Disconnect to
Blame, FORBES (Feb. 6, 2019, 7:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/daveywinder/2019
/02/06/your-new-car-is-a-hacker-magnet-automotive-industry-disconnect-to-blame/#16b88
b3c3b76 [https://perma.cc/5CHL-GN24] (describing cybersecurity risks in the automotive
industry). In addition, while we focus on the repair market in the United States, it is important to note that there are similar issues with cars and repair worldwide. For example,
the Australian government is considering a mandate on sharing repair information for motor vehicles, albeit on a limited basis. See Leanne Wiseman, Kanchana Kariyawasam & Lucas
Davey, The Mandatory Repair Scheme for Motor Vehicles 2019: Australia’s First Response to the International Right to Repair Movement?, 48 AUSTL. BUS. L. REV. 218, 231 (2020) (analyzing the
proposed mandate).
8. See Kessler, supra note 2.
9. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93K, § 2 (2019); Memorandum of Understanding Among
Automotive Aftermarket Industry Association, Coalition for Auto Repair Equality, Alliance
of Automobile Manufacturers and Association of Global Automakers (Jan. 15, 2014), http:
//www.njgca.org/wp-content/uploads/Right-to-Repair-national-MOU-01-23-14.pdf [https:
//perma.cc/M67B-339K] [hereinafter MOU]. In addition, there is a separate MOU for
commercial vehicles. See Memorandum of Understanding: National Commercial Vehicle
Service Information (Aug. 12, 2015), https://www.autocare.org/workarea/Download
Asset.aspx?id=2646&gmssopc=1 [https://perma.cc/T8YL-FXNM]. In this Article, we will use
“MOU” to refer to the January 2014 version, which focused on personal vehicles (or “light
duty” vehicles).
10. See Right to Repair, AUTO CARE ASSOC., https://www.autocare.org/governmentaffairs/issues/right-to-repair [https://perma.cc/2PTH-WM7N] (noting the exclusion of
telematics from the Massachusetts law and national agreement); Kessler, supra note 2; Ma,
supra note 1.
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secured by technological protection measures, and are excluded
11
from the scope of the legislation and the MOU.
At the same time, the manufacturers’ exclusive control over
telematics systems enables them to offer repair services and associated products in a coercive manner that may amount to deceptive
12
advertising. The coercive nature of the communications emanating from the system stems from the special relationship that car
manufacturers have with their consumers, often based on trust and
loyalty; the “captive audience” status of the driver; and the infor13
mation asymmetry between the parties.
These two interrelated features brought about by the manufacturers’ increasing use of telematics systems—exclusive control over
diagnostic data and coercive advertising of repair and maintenance
services—pose a serious threat to competition in the market for car
repairs and endanger consumers’ right to repair (or choice of
14
where to repair) their cars.
This Article posits that maintaining competition in the market
for car repairs is vital. The justifications for a right to repair include, inter alia, the need to protect consumers’ sense of autonomy and enable them to realize an important aspect of product
ownership, ensure competitive pricing of repair and maintenance
services and associated products, minimize environmental waste,
15
and encourage innovation. Maintaining competition in the automobile repair market is particularly important considering the
centrality of all types of vehicles to the economy. The passenger car
remains one of the more valued personal property items of most
16
Americans. A recent Gallup poll found that eighty-six percent of
Americans own or lease an automobile or some other type of vehi17
cle, and sixty-four percent of Americans drive daily. Vehicles and

11. See infra notes 60–66 and accompanying text.
12. For a detailed discussion, see infra Part II.
13. For a detailed discussion of these and other related factors that contribute to the
coercive nature of telematics-based communications, see infra Section II.A.
14. We use the term “consumer” broadly to include any end user possessing a vehicle,
whether it is the vehicle’s owner, lessee or driver authorized to use the car, and regardless of
whether the use is for personal or business purposes.
15. For a detailed discussion, see infra Section 1.A.
16. The average price of a new car in 2019 was approximately $36,000. Anna Hecht, Car
Prices Are Increasing—Here’s How That Can Hurt Americans, CNBC (Oct. 22, 2019, 11:42 AM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/10/22/car-prices-are-rapidly-increasing-heres-why-thats-badfor-americans.html [https://perma.cc/64LD-AKNA]. One insurance company estimates
that an average renter in a two bedroom apartment has approximately $30,000 in total personal property. Sienna Kossman, 4 Common Myths About Renters Insurance, U.S. NEWS (Sept.
12, 2013, 2:00 PM), https://money.usnews.com/money/personal-finance/articles/2013/09
/12/4-common-myths-about-renters-insurance.
17. Megan Brenan, 83% of U.S. Adults Drive Frequently; Fewer Enjoy It a Lot, GALLUP (July
9, 2018), https://news.gallup.com/poll/236813/adults-drive-frequently-fewer-enjoy-lot.aspx
[https://perma.cc/V8PL-EFC3].
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other forms of equipment also play a significant role in the agricul18
tural and military spheres. The severity of the harm that could be
wrought to the U.S. economy by a manufacturer monopoly over
the vehicle repair market is highlighted by national policymakers
incorporating a repair agenda into their 2020 presidential campaigns and by the involvement of the Federal Trade Commission
19
(FTC). Notably, the struggle to maintain competition in the vehicle repair market corresponds with a more general effort to preserve the consumers’ right to repair their own personal devices
20
(particularly, consumer electronics).
Unfortunately, with the rise of telematics, the right to repair vehicles is under siege. In order to ensure that manufacturers do not
use the new technological abilities to skirt their legal obligations
and monopolize the market for car repairs, policy makers must pay
due attention to this area. This Article identifies the potential anticompetitive effect of the switch to telematics on the vehicle repair
market and explores concrete directions that could be used to
tackle the problem.
In order to maintain an effective right to repair cars, we urge
policy makers to, first, regulate the way in which manufacturers are
21
allowed to communicate to their consumers in their cars, and second, guarantee that access to diagnostic information transmitted
22
via telematics systems remains open to all. This Article calls for a
combined policy approach, under which various agencies, including state legislatures, courts, the FTC, and Congress, would play
significant roles. In addition to unfair competition and consumer
protection law, this Article explores the need to consider certain

18. See Elle Ekman, Opinion, Here’s One Reason the U.S. Military Can’t Fix Its Own Equipment, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 20, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/20/opinion/militaryright-to-repair.html [https://perma.cc/HS7U-2A9H] (concerning the military); Richard
Jensen, Hackers, Farmers, and Doctors Unite! Support for Right to Repair Laws Slowly Grows, ARS
TECHNICA (June 20, 2019, 7:30 AM), https://arstechnica.com/gadgets/2019/06/hackersfarmers-and-doctors-unite-support-for-right-to-repair-laws-slowly-grows
[https://perma.cc
/4QSN-6ND4] (concerning farmers).
19. See, e.g., Matthew Gault, Bernie Sanders Calls for a National Right to Repair Law for Farmers, VICE (May 5, 2019, 5:48 PM), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/8xzqmp/berniesanders-calls-for-a-national-right-to-repair-law-for-farmers [https://perma.cc/6Y67-UUX5];
Makena Kelly, Elizabeth Warren Comes Out in Support of a National Right-to-Repair Law for Farm
Equipment, THE VERGE (Mar. 27, 2019, 12:08 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2019/3/27
/18284011/elizabeth-warren-apple-right-to-repair-john-deere-law-presidential-campaigniowa; Nixing the Fix: A Workshop on Repair Restrictions, FTC (July 16, 2019), https:
//www.ftc.gov/news-events/events-calendar/nixing-fix-workshop-repair-restrictions [https:
//perma.cc/GR2A-VBJU] [hereinafter FTC Workshop].
20. See generally Leah Chan Grinvald & Ofer Tur-Sinai, Intellectual Property Law and the
Right to Repair, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 63 (2019) (discussing the emergence of a social movement advocating a right to repair consumer products).
21. See infra Part II.
22. See infra Part III.

WINTER 2021]

Smart Cars, Telematics and Repair

289

aspects of intellectual property law and construe them in a manner
that enables the right to repair to be fully implemented.
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows. In Part I, we
provide a brief overview of the various justifications for a right to
repair that we discussed in general in an earlier piece, while focus23
ing on specific attributes of the car industry. Next, we provide a
historical perspective of the automotive right to repair movement.
We also outline in greater detail the developments in vehicle
telematics that may impact the repair market and discuss current
efforts to update the applicable legal framework to account for
such developments. All of this provides the context for the rest of
our discussion, which is comprised of two prongs. First, in Part II,
we argue that manufacturers have worked hard to create a special
relationship with their consumers—one based on trust and loyalty.
In light of this special relationship, and considering the “captive
audience” status of consumers while they are in their cars, we argue that there is a high probability that manufacturers’ communications emanating from a car’s telematics system will be deceptive.
Based on this prospect, we urge the FTC to become more active in
policing how manufacturers are communicating repair information to their consumers. Second, in Part III, we argue that the
potential competitive harm in the repair market resulting from the
manufacturers’ exclusive control over the telematics data feed warrants proactive solutions. These include updating state consumer
protection legislation, as well as closely examining the intellectual
property laws that effectively aid car manufacturers in maintaining
exclusivity over their telematics systems and diagnostic data. The
issues surrounding access and control over telematics data are controversial, and this Article’s thesis and arguments will likely face
challenges. Therefore, we lay out some of these challenges and offer responses to them in Part IV.
I. THE RIGHT TO REPAIR
In this Part, we briefly discuss the main justifications for a right
to repair, with a particular focus on their application in the context
of vehicle repairs. We will then turn to a historical overview of legislative and private ordering efforts to secure a right to repair for
vehicles and, finally, provide an analysis of why efforts are still
needed to safeguard this right.

23.

See Grinvald & Tur-Sinai, supra note 20, at 83–96.
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A. Justifying a Right to Repair
1. Consumer Autonomy and Property Rights
One of the most persuasive justifications for a right to repair (at
least from a consumer’s perspective) is preserving a sense of autonomy, or the ability for the consumer to determine by herself
24
what to do with her own personal things. Based on this consideration, we previously argued that at the core of a right to repair is the
25
individual consumer’s ability to engage in repair activities. While
most consumers are not likely to repair their own cars, consumers
must nevertheless retain a right to choose how, when, and where to
repair their cars in order to uphold their autonomy and a meaningful sense of property ownership.
The sentiment for autonomy is often intertwined with a property
/ownership rationale that a consumer should have the ability to
26
repair because they “own” their “stuff.” This justification is premised on the quid pro quo understanding of a personal property
transaction: a consumer pays money for a product, and in return
27
she obtains ownership of that product. These two interrelated rationales have been expressed at public hearings on the topic. For
example, at a hearing held by the U.S. Copyright Office on access
to software for purposes of repair, one consumer stated, “it’s my
own damn car, I paid for it, I should be able to repair it or have the
28
person of my choice do it for me.”
2. Static Efficiency (Concern for Competition)
Another strong justification for a right to repair is the need to
maintain competition in the repair market, particularly for vehicles. The overall market for vehicle repair is large. In the United

24. For a general discussion of arguments rooted in consumer autonomy justifying a
right to repair, see id. at 67, 81, 89.
25. Id. at 99.
26. See Adam Wernick, The ‘Right to Repair’ Movement Wants You To Be Able to Fix Your
Own Stuff, THE WORLD: LIVING EARTH (Dec. 24, 2018), https://www.pri.org/stories/2018-1224/right-repair-movement-wants-you-be-able-fix-your-own-stuff [https://perma.cc/QQ8NQ7BB].
27. This is certainly how the U.S. Supreme Court views a straightforward sale transaction, stating in the patent context, “[a] sale transfers the right to use, sell, or import because
those are the rights that come along with ownership.” Impression Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark
Int’l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523, 1534 (2017).
28. REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, SECTION 1201 RULEMAKING: SEVENTH TRIENNIAL
PROCEEDING TO DETERMINE EXEMPTIONS TO THE PROHIBITION ON CIRCUMVENTION,
INTRODUCTION AND RECOMMENDED REGULATORY LANGUAGE OF THE ACTING REGISTER OF
COPYRIGHTS 3 (2018) [hereinafter SECTION 1201 RULEMAKING PROCEEDING].
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States this includes manufacturers—and their dealerships—and
independent entities, such as independent repair parts manufac29
turers and both large and small repair shops.
If manufacturers were able to steer consumers to only authorized repair entities, the independent repair market would presumably collapse. Independent repair shops would likely go out of
business, not to mention the entire industry that has been built on
supplying various services to these independent repair shops.
Without competition in the repair market, manufacturers would
be able to set prices that have no relation to the value of the services. Consumers would be forced to decide whether they could afford such repairs or need to forego using their vehicles. For some
consumers, this choice could have a serious impact on their ability
to earn a living, as many consumers rely on their vehicles to
transport them to their places of employment or use their vehicles
30
as part of their jobs. Recognizing these concerns, the FTC has
shown a growing interest in ensuring that deceptive practices are
31
not creating monopolies in the repair market.
3. Environmental Concerns
If personal products, including vehicles, cannot be repaired,
they are thrown away and end up in landfills. 32 The growing inability to repair consumer electronic products has caused some countries to pay greater attention to a right to repair because of the in33
crease in environmental waste. While cars that cannot be repaired

29. The Auto Care Association, for example, is a national trade organization that represents over 150,000 “independent businesses that manufacture, distribute, and sell motor
vehicle parts, accessories, tools, equipment, materials, and supplies, and perform vehicle
service and repair.” Auto Care Ass’n, Consumer Tech. Ass’n, iFixit & Owners’ Rights Initiative, Petition to Renew a Current Exemption Under 17 U.S.C. § 1201, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF. (July
31, 2017), https://cdn.loc.gov/copyright/1201/2018/petitions-073117/Renewal%20Pet.
%20-%20Repair%20-%20ACA.pdf [https://perma.cc/T3UF-MJKD].
30. See Adie Tomer, America’s Commuting Choices: 5 Major Takeaways from 2016 Census
Data, BROOKINGS (Oct. 3, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/the-avenue/2017/10/03
/americans-commuting-choices-5-major-takeaways-from-2016-census-data [https://perma.cc
/G2G2-8HZQ] (finding that over 76 percent of Americans drive alone to work every day).
31. See FTC Workshop, supra note 19; see also infra note 125 and accompanying text.
32. See CBC News, Broken Appliances: Why You May Need Repairs More Often, YOUTUBE
(Feb. 28, 2020), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UwfIbm_JrPI (interviewing Nathan
Proctor).
33. For example, the European Union passed the Waste Framework Directive which
mandates certain products to be designed to be repairable. Directive 2008/98/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 2008 on Waste and Repealing
Certain Directives, 2008 O.J. (L 312) 3 [hereinafter Waste Framework Directive]; see also
Paul A. Davies, Eun-Kyung Lee & Patrick Braasch, The EU Adopts Four Directives to Solidify Europe’s Leading Position in Waste Management, LATHAM & WATKINS: ENV’T, LAND & RES.
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can still have their parts and materials salvaged and reused, it is estimated that up to twenty-five percent of every car will make its way
34
into a landfill. Landfills emit their own pollution, and globally,
35
countries are working to reduce pollutive emissions of all types.
Environmental concerns appear to be driving the repair movement
in the European Union, which has been the most aggressive in legislating for longer end-of-use lifecycles and repair parts availabil36
ity. The same rationale supports a right to repair in the United
States.
4. Dynamic Efficiency (Innovation)
Lastly, dynamic efficiency considerations provide a strong justification for a right to repair. Where repair markets are open, consumers, independent repair shops, and tool developers have the
ability and motivation to create new methods of repair, develop or
improve diagnostic and repair tools, and create user-generated
tips, manuals, and kits that could significantly benefit others. 37 In
addition, engaging in repair requires (and thus, provides an incentive for) observation and acquisition of knowledge. One famous
example of innovation born out of repair is the first operative airplane built by the Wright brothers at the beginning of the twenti38
eth century. The brothers, working alone from their bicycle repair shop, solved the problem of “controlled flight” that had
39
occupied the minds of many engineers throughout the years.
Wilbur, one of the brothers, found the solution while toying in
40
their store with a rectangular bicycle inner-tube box. Wilbur concluded that “by connecting the motion of a flying machine’s wings
in relation to one another, twisting the axis of the wings in the

(July 6, 2018), https://www.globalelr.com/2018/07/the-eu-adopts-four-directives-to-solidifyeuropes-leading-position-in-waste-management [https://perma.cc/A4CS-THFG].
34. Ben Hewitt, Where Your Car Goes to Die, POPULAR MECHS. (Oct. 1, 2009), https:
//www.popularmechanics.com/cars/a1481/4213384 [https://perma.cc/6XDZ-7YCB].
35. See, e.g., Waste Framework Directive, supra note 33.
36. See, e.g., Roger Harrabin, EU Brings in ‘Right to Repair’ Rules for Appliances, BBC NEWS
(Oct. 1, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/business-49884827 [https://perma.cc/3V4V5G8G].
37. For examples of repair tools and manuals, see IFIXIT, https://www.ifixit.com/ (last
visited Dec. 26, 2020).
38. See Katherine White, What If Bicycles Held the Secret to Human Flight?, HENRY FORD,
https://www.thehenryford.org/explore/stories-of-innovation/what-if/wright-brothers
[https://perma.cc/L3RQ-YNML]; Brittany McCrigler, The Wright Way: Repair Teaches Engineering, IFIXIT (Mar. 21, 2013), https://www.ifixit.com/News/the-wright-way-to-teachengineering [https://perma.cc/SHJ6-96C3].
39. White, supra note 38.
40. Id.
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same way a box twists,” a pilot could control the aircraft. This led
to the successful development of the first airplane and is consid42
ered a foundation of modern-day aeronautics. The modern-day
automotive industry could similarly benefit from user innovation
born out of repair.
B. Historical Perspective: Legislation and Private Ordering
The ability to perform maintenance on and repair a car relies on
the ability to accurately diagnose the car’s status. While diagnostic
information may not always be a precondition for diagnosing and
fixing the car’s problem, at the very least it can make diagnosing
43
the problem quicker and more efficient. Up until recently, most
diagnostic data generated by various vehicle modules could be retrieved by connecting to the OBD port, which is standardized
across makes and models and for many vehicles is located under
44
the steering wheel. The standardization of on-board diagnostics
began with the 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act, which required automakers to equip vehicles with a standardized form of
45
emissions monitoring. Every vehicle, beginning with the 1996
model year, was required to have a standardized OBD port
through which information on the vehicle’s emission system could
46
be retrieved. Over the years, more diagnostic and repair information besides emissions information has become available
through the OBD port, and a concern arose that access to such in47
formation could be restricted by the manufacturers. Against this
background, several aftermarket organizations joined together
48
with a collective goal of securing such access through legislation.

41. Id.
42. See, e.g., id.; see also McCrigler, supra note 38 (noting other “bike repair concepts”
that are mirrored in the airplane built by the Wright brothers).
43. See, e.g., Motor & Equip. Mfr.’s Ass’n, Nixing the Fix—Call for Research and Data, FTC
1, 14 (Apr. 30, 2019), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FTC-2019-0013-0022 (click
on “Download” under “The Motor and Equipment Manufacturers Association”) [https:
//perma.cc/5JKD-U2GT] [hereinafter MEMA Submission] (“Open and unbiased access to
diagnostic information is essential for all repairers and do-it-yourself consumers.”).
44. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., SECTION 1201 ROUNDTABLE 56 (Apr. 25, 2018), https:
//www.copyright.gov/1201/2018/hearing-transcripts/1201-Rulemaking-Public-Roundtable04-25-2018.pdf#page=56 [https://perma.cc/6NUM-WAFQ].
45. EPA, ON-BOARD DIAGNOSTIC REGULATIONS AND REQUIREMENTS: QUESTIONS AND
ANSWERS 2 (2003), https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi/P100LW9G.PDF?Dockey=
P100LW9G.PDF [https://perma.cc/F3GY-FFS3] [hereinafter EPA].
46. Id. at 8.
47. See Erica Schueller, Who Has the Right to Repair?, VEHICLE SERV. PROS (Feb. 12, 2018),
https://www.vehicleservicepros.com/shop-operations/data-telematics/article/20989863
/who-has-the-right-to-repair [https://perma.cc/3383-9BG6].
48. Id.
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In 2012, Massachusetts became the first and only state in the
United States to enact an “automotive right to repair” law that required manufacturers to provide independent repair shops access
on “fair and reasonable terms” to the same types of repair infor49
mation and tools that it provided to authorized dealers. In 2014,
following this enactment, the Association of Global Automakers
entered into a MOU with organizations that represented the auto
50
repair industry. In exchange for the auto industry agreeing to
make the provisions of the Massachusetts repair law the nationwide
standard, the repair industry agreed to oppose and not fund new
51
state-based legislative initiatives. The MOU spans all fifty states
52
and covers a majority of automakers in the United States.
These developments were seen as a win for the auto repair industry, even though Massachusetts remains the only state to have
passed car repair legislation and the MOU does not cover all car
53
manufacturers in the United States. This was the sentiment until
recently, despite the fact that for some independent repair shops,
keeping up with the latest manufacturer information even under
the current regime is expensive and time-consuming. For example,
where a repair shop services multiple types of vehicles, that shop
needs to ensure their technicians are continuously trained on a variety of different manufacturer computer systems and also pay to
54
access such systems. A few recent developments since 2014, however, have begun to erode the effectiveness of both the Massachusetts law and the MOU—including the move towards producing
“smarter” cars with telematics systems wirelessly connected to the

49. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93K (2019); Jonathan Ng, Independent Auto Repair Shops
Want Right-to-Repair Law Updated, BOS. HERALD (June 18, 2019), https://
www.bostonherald.com/2019/06/18/independent-auto-repair-shops-want-right-to-repairlaw-updated.
50. MOU, supra note 9.
51. See id; Gabe Nelson, Automakers Agree to ‘Right to Repair’ Deal, AUTO. NEWS (Jan. 25,
2014, 12:00 AM), https://www.autonews.com/article/20140125/RETAIL05/301279936
/automakers-agree-to-right-to-repair-deal [https://perma.cc/S6YB-H6J5] (quoting the president of the Association of Global Automakers regarding the downside to having 50 different state laws).
52. MOU, supra note 9; Our Members, ALL. FOR AUTO. INNOVATION, https:
//www.autosinnovate.org/about/our-members [https://perma.cc/GDH6-C3YH].
53. See Kyle Wiens, You Gotta Fight for Your Right to Repair Your Car, THE ATLANTIC (Feb.
13, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2014/02/you-gotta-fight-foryour-right-to-repair-your-car/283791 [https://perma.cc/CLF9-V275] (citing that twentythree car manufacturers were required to sign the pledge).
54. See Where We Live, Tell Us: Should Consumers Have the ‘Right to Repair’ Their Own Devices?, WNPR, at 24:15–30:05 (Nov. 14, 2019), https://www.wnpr.org/post/tell-us-shouldconsumers-have-right-repair-their-own-devices [https://perma.cc/C53A-WBAM] [hereinafter Where We Live] (interviewing independent repair mechanic).
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manufacturers. This development and its potential impact will be
discussed in the next section.
C. The Need for Current Efforts to Update Legislation and the MOU
By virtue of the MOU, until recently, the majority of car diagnostic information for most vehicle models could be accessed through
the car’s OBD port. By plugging a scanning tool into the OBD
port, mechanics could retrieve the error codes and other diagnostic information from the car, identify the problem, and clear the
56
code from the computer’s memory once the problem was fixed.
Nowadays, however, manufacturers are moving away from having the diagnostic information funnel into the OBD system, and
instead, they are transitioning the information into separate
57
telematics systems. Passenger vehicle telematics is a growing market, with some research positing that approximately forty-seven
percent of all new cars sold in North America in 2017 included
58
some form of telematics system. This number is expected to con59
tinue to increase going forward.
The telematics system is typically the same computer system utilized for in-car entertainment and downloads and, unlike the
60
OBD, is not standardized across the different car manufacturers.
Each car manufacturer has their own type of system, as there is no
requirement in the MOU or elsewhere that software be standard61
ized. Relatedly, various components of the telematics system are
secured by technological protection measures (TPMs) to bar unau-

55. A different development that has created an obstacle for the auto repair industry is
a greater use by manufacturers of patents to protect automobile parts and accessories. See
Joshua D. Sarnoff, White Paper on Protecting the Consumer Patent Law Right of Repair and the Aftermarket for Exterior Motor Vehicle Repair Parts: The PARTS Act, S. 812, H.R. 1879, 115th Congress
1, 13–14 (Nov. 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3082289; Grinvald & Tur-Sinai, supra note 20, at 112–16.
56. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., supra note 44, at 56.
57. Id. at 57–58; infra notes 67–68 and accompanying text.
58. The Global Automotive OEM Telematics Market 2018–2023 - Detailed Profiles of 21 Major
Car OEMs and Their Telematics Propositions – ResearchAndMarkets.com, BUS. WIRE (Sept. 5, 2018,
7:14
AM),
https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20180905005471/en/GlobalAutomotive-OEM-Telematics-Market-2018-2023 [https://perma.cc/J7VN-DV4R].
59. See id.
60. See Jake Holmes & Anthony Alaniz, Every Car Infotainment System Available in 2020,
CNET: ROADSHOW (Oct. 28, 2019), https://www.cnet.com/roadshow/news/carinfotainment-system-automotive-tech-guide [https://perma.cc/CD4W-UCGF] (highlighting
the different mainstream brands’ infotainment systems).
61. See Auto Care Ass’n, Long Comment Regarding a Proposed Exemption Under 17 U.S.C. §
1201, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF. 1, 3, https://cdn.loc.gov/copyright/1201/2018/comments121817/class7/class-07-initialcomments-auto-care-association.pdf [https://perma.cc/9N4WD9T3].
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62

thorized access to the system. These TPMs typically bar access to
both copyrighted components (like the entertainment portion of
the data) and uncopyrightable elements (like the car’s diagnostic
63
data). Thus, unlike scan tool data, diagnostic telematics data is
not accessible to everyone.
The MOU makes clear that the obligations of the covered car
manufacturers do not apply to the data feed funneled through
64
telematics systems. It exempts from the scope of the agreement
“telematics services or any other remote or information service, diagnostic or otherwise, delivered to or derived from the vehicle by
65
mobile communications . . . .” Similar language is found in the
66
2012 Massachusetts law, which served as a template for the MOU.
Currently, the OBD port can still be utilized to access some diagnostic information, but testimony from various repair proponents allege that this information is becoming more and more lim67
ited. Absent access to the telematic feed, it might be difficult to
assess what information manufacturers are “hiding” that could be
useful for diagnostics and repair and is not otherwise available to
third parties. In the near future, with expected advances in smart
cars and multiple connected sensors around the car, it could very
well be that information transmitted exclusively via the telematics
68
system will be crucial to diagnosing car issues. Clearly, even to the

62. Cf. Ford Motor Co. v. Autel US Inc., No. 14-13760, 2015 WL 5729067, at *7–8 (E.D.
Mich. Sept. 30, 2015) (where Ford argued that Autel created a program to circumvent
Ford’s security measures and access its data compilations without authorization, and then
used this data in developing a competing diagnostics product).
63. See Auto Care Ass’n, supra note 61, at 6.
64. It is worth noting that the car industry believes that it is still under the obligation to
provide diagnostic information and claims that it continues to do so. Missing from their
statements, however, is any acknowledgement that the diagnostic information retrieved
from the OBD is limited in nature. See Ma, supra note 1.
65. MOU, supra note 9, at § 2(e).
66. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93K, § 2(f) (2019).
67. See SECTION 1201 RULEMAKING PROCEEDING, supra note 28, at 65 (“The OBD port
does not provide all the same information that happens over the telematics data feed. It
used to be that was where you got all the information. Increasingly, there’s less and less
available on those OBD ports.”); id. at 66 (noting, in regard to Tesla, that “there’s almost no
information on the OBD port and instead it’s all coming over the telemetry data that’s encrypted”); Shira Schoenberg, New Right to Repair Battle Rages Between Car Manufacturers and
Repair Shops, MASSLIVE (May 13, 2019), https://www.masslive.com/news/2019/05
/new-right-to-repair-battle-rages-between-car-manufacturers-and-repair-shops.html [https://
perma.cc/R3E5-2XCF] (noting that “[i]ndependent shops say the law does not adequately
address telematics” whereas manufacturers say “the old law works just fine” because it already mandates automakers to provide all information necessary to diagnose and repair a
vehicle).
68. See, e.g., MEMA Submission, supra note 43, at 14 (maintaining that “[o]pen and unbiased access to diagnostic information is essential for all repairers and do-it-yourself consumers”); Auto Care Ass’n, Re: Nixing the Fix: A Workshop on Repair Restrictions, FTC 1, 3 (May
6, 2019), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FTC-2019-0013-0010 (click on “Download” under “Comment Submitted by Auto Care Association”) [https://perma.cc/792P-
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extent independent repair shops could diagnose a problem without access to all available data, it would most likely take them longer and make their service less efficient and more costly for the customer. Furthermore, even if all diagnostic information included in
the telematics feed were also available through the OBD port, the
shift to diagnostics over-the-air grants manufacturers the advantage
of getting the information in real time, whereas independent mechanics only get it if and when the car owner brings the vehicle to
their shop. Altogether, then, unlike in the past where the driver
could take her car to any mechanic who could plug into the OBD
port to retrieve much of the diagnostic information needed for repair, independent repair shops in the near future might likely have
to turn away the driver because she has a “smart car” and a wirelessly-connected telematics system. Even to the extent they are still
able, in principle, to provide repair services to a “smart car,” independent repair shops would frequently be in an unfavorable position compared to an authorized dealership with access to the
telematics system.
It should be noted that, aside from using proprietary diagnostic
tools and software, the manufacturers are required to offer, by virtue of the Massachusetts law and the MOU, some diagnostic information that can be extracted by scanning tools and applications
69
developed by third parties. Yet, with the shift toward TPMprotected telematics systems, such third-party tools and applications are likely to be blocked from accessing any meaningful data.
The lack of standardization in the telematics industry is also likely
70
to pose difficulties for third party developers. In addition, even to
the extent it is technologically feasible to develop diagnostic tools
that retrieve data from a telematics system, this process may involve
infringement of intellectual property rights, as will be discussed be71
low.
All of this has created the need to update the Massachusetts law
(as well as the MOU) to ensure that the switch to telematics does
72
not curtail access to diagnostic data. Yet, the switch to telematics
has also opened new ways for the manufacturers to communicate

25PX] (pointing out servicers’ need to access repair information that is increasingly available through telematic systems only).
69. For the popularity of third-party diagnostic tools, see, for example, MEMA Submission, supra note 43, at 14. Such a tool can typically be used to repair multiple models of vehicles.
70. For the lack of standardization in the telematics industry, see supra notes 60–61 and
accompanying text.
71. For discussion, see infra Section III.B.
72. For discussion of specifics of the ballot initiative that was passed by Massachusetts
voters and amends the law, see infra Part III.
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with the consumers. As some car industry analysts see it,
“[t]elematics is . . . helping OEMs [original equipment manufacturers] to strengthen their customer association to their brand by
converting one-time sales into continual service-centered relation73
ships.” The next Part argues that this effort to capitalize on manufacturers’ relationships with their consumers poses some serious
concerns for competition in the aftermarket that warrant close
scrutiny and regulatory or legislative action.
II. TELEMATICS AND THE POTENTIAL FOR DECEPTIVE ADVERTISING
The use of telematics enables car manufacturers to identify and
diagnose certain problems in real time, communicate with consumers regarding such problems, and guide them to fix those
problems at a specified facility. Depending on the car model, this
information could be delivered to consumers in various ways, including by phone, through e-mail or app messaging, through the
two-way voice system installed in the car, or via the car’s media
screen.
The prospect of car manufacturers delivering in-car messaging
to consumers is not new. Back in 2009, reports surfaced of Mercedes-Benz testing the possibility of using the in-car telematics system to advertise products and services, including repair services, to
74
drivers. Nowadays, the recommendations and offerings to car
owners can be individually tailored based on the large volume of
diagnostic information transmitted from the car to the manufac75
turer in real time. Such practices are likely to increase significant-

73. Analysis of Embedded Telematics in the Automotive Industry - Global Forecast to 2025 Featuring OnStar, Ford, Volkswagen, Mercedes-Benz – ResearchAndMarkets.com, BUS. WIRE (Oct. 31,
2019, 6:34 AM), https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20191031005444/en/AnalysisEmbedded-Telematics-Automotive-Industry—-Global [https://perma.cc/HTP4-LGXR]. In
addition, in the SWOT analysis for automakers, it is identified as an opportunity to establish
direct and long-term customer relationships, and a strength is direct contact with the vehicle
user. DIETMAR P. F. MÖLLER & ROLAND E. HAAS, GUIDE TO AUTOMOTIVE CONNECTIVITY AND
CYBERSECURITY: TRENDS, TECHNOLOGIES, INNOVATIONS AND APPLICATIONS 5 (2019).
74. Ralph Hanson, Mercedes to Pilot Ads in Tele Aid Telematics System, MOTOR AUTH. (Apr.
28, 2009), https://www.motorauthority.com/news/1033006_mercedes-to-pilot-ads-in-teleaid-telematics-system [https://perma.cc/AH8Y-MP5D]; Mercedes’ OnStar Clone Tries Out Ads,
PCMAG (Apr. 27, 2009), https://www.pcmag.com/archive/mercedes-onstar-clone-tries-outads-239712 [https://perma.cc/4LX2-G6ZF] (expressing an expectation, in 2009, that “[c]ar
dealers may soon have a system that lets them send advertising messages via the two-way
voice and data telematics system in many new cars”).
75. See ALAN MCQUINN & DANIEL CASTRO, INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION FOUND., A
POLICYMAKER’S GUIDE TO CONNECTED CARS 6 (2018), http://www2.itif.org/2018policymakers-guide-connected-cars.pdf [https://perma.cc/GM5Y-RA62].
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ly in the near future as the use of telematics becomes ubiquitous.
Notably, the use of tailored advertising, including offerings related
to predictive maintenance and repair, is not merely a side effect of
technological developments, but rather a part of a business strategy
77
embraced by many vehicle manufacturers.
The increased ability to rely on remote diagnostics to detect
problems as early as possible, notify the driver of such problems in
real time, and encourage preventive maintenance and repair could
be highly beneficial. At the same time, the practice of manufacturers communicating with car owners in real time based on exclusive
diagnostic information could significantly increase manufacturers’
competitive position in repair and replacement parts markets,
78
which may come at the expense of other important values.
It is important to clarify upfront that this Article does not propose banning these practices altogether. Promoting one’s products
79
and services is the backbone of commercial business practice.
Nevertheless, in certain circumstances, the state regulates such
practices—usually in order to preserve fairness in competition and
protect consumers from deception and coercive marketing prac80
tices. As will be detailed below, telematics-based promotion of repair and maintenance services is a context in which some level of
regulation may be warranted. This Article argues that due to the
“captivity” of the consumers in their cars and their unique relationship with manufacturers (that the manufacturers have worked hard
to create and maintain), telematics-based advertising poses a threat
to competition and consumer welfare. Policy makers should, therefore, pay close attention to manufacturers’ increasing use of these

76. See, e.g., Ihor Starepravo, From Device-Connected to Car-Connected: Unlock the Full Power
of Connected Car Commerce, DATA DRIVEN INVESTOR (July 4, 2019) (noting that in-car advertising is an important avenue for generating value for manufacturers, and that “[t]his use case
is gaining traction as predictive maintenance and smart telematics becomes mainstream”).
77. See, e.g., id.; MCKINSEY & CO., MONETIZING CAR DATA 24 (2016), https:
//www.mckinsey.com/~/media/McKinsey/Industries/Automotive%20and%20Assembly
/Our%20Insights/Monetizing%20car%20data/Monetizing-car-data.ashx [https://perma.cc
/LM67-STDY] (noting such practices as part of the strategies for increasing revenue generating).
78. For discussion of such values, see supra Section I.A. Surely, there are other concerns
associated with the use of telematics and in-car notifications, including a safety concern resulting from distraction to the driver.
79. In addition, commercial speech is a form of protected speech, although it is typically acknowledged that there is a significant governmental interest in protecting consumers
such that commercial speech can be regulated. See, e.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (holding commercial speech is entitled to
First Amendment protection); Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who’s Afraid of Commercial
Speech?, 76 VA. L. REV. 627 (1990) (discussing the history of the First Amendment and commercial speech).
80. See infra Section II.B.
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new technologies to ensure that the costs imposed on society by
these practices do not end up outweighing their related benefits.
A. Manufacturers and Their Consumers:
Trust and the Captive Consumer
In order to unpack the significant impact that telematics-based
advertising could have, this Section will first examine the relationship between consumers and their car manufacturers. It will show
that car manufacturers have worked to instill a sense of trust and
81
loyalty in their consumers. Not only have manufacturers convinced their consumers to trust that their cars will be safe and work
well, but they have utilized a variety of different mechanisms to foster a loyal relationship with their consumers. In this way, once consumers have purchased their car from one particular manufacturer, this relationship is meant to keep drawing them back—for
maintenance, repairs, and eventually new cars. This Section then
argues that when the consumer is in the car, the consumer is a
“captive audience.” This factor could pose a serious threat to competition in the market for repair services and products when combined with the type of information being provided (typically technical information that the average consumer would not necessarily
understand) and the unique relationship between the consumer
and the manufacturer.
1. Trust and Loyalty in the Car Market
Car manufacturers have been working to build trust and loyalty
in the American public since the late nineteenth century, with the
82
introduction of the personal vehicle. First, car manufacturers
needed to convince the public that cars were safe to drive, notwith83
standing that the early vehicles could be quite dangerous. Car
81. This type of trust is referred to as “system trust,” which “presumes the functionality
and reliability of a system, and allows trust to be placed in the function of the system rather
than the individual people involved in it.” Jennifer Tong, Do You Trust Your Car? Enacting
Car Safety 18 (Spring 2016) (M.A. thesis, Lund University) https://lup.lub.lu.se
/luur/download?func=downloadFile&recordOId=8894338&fileOId=8894339 (citing NIKLAS
LUHMANN, TRUST AND POWER (1979)).
82. See DAVID O. WHITTEN & BESSIE EMRICK WHITTEN, HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN
BUSINESS HISTORY: EXTRACTIVES, MANUFACTURING, AND SERVICES 270–71 (1997) (noting
that German and French companies began manufacturing personal vehicles at the commercial level in the 1880s; in 1900, there were approximately 8,000 personal vehicles in the
United States, and by 1926, there were approximately 19 million).
83. See SALLY H. CLARKE, TRUST AND POWER: CONSUMERS, THE MODERN CORPORATION,
AND THE MAKING OF THE UNITED STATES AUTOMOBILE MARKET 34 (2007).
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manufacturers used a variety of different methods—from straightforward advertising to celebrity “influencers,” motor clubs, and
stunt shows—to attempt to convince the public that they should
84
own a car. Second, in order to sustain their growth and market
85
share, car manufacturers had to cultivate their consumers’ loyalty
so that consumers would continue to want to return to the manu86
facturer with whom they have this trusting and loyal relationship.
Sales and financing contracts both helped to begin and sustain this
87
relationship with consumers.
With the move to smart cars, which remain “tethered” to the
manufacturer in many ways, the relationship between a car manufacturer and its consumer may become even stronger and involve a
greater degree of dependence on the manufacturer. We use the
term tethering to mean “the strategy of maintaining an ongoing
connection between a consumer good and its seller that often renders that good in some way dependent on the seller for its ordinary
88
operation.” In the era of the “Internet of Things,” tethering becomes ubiquitous. Smart cars, in particular, provide their drivers
multiple functions and services that are based on connectivity,
89
starting with navigation and ending in infotainment apps. At the
same time, this connectivity has been strategically used by manufacturers to strengthen their direct and long-term relationships
90
with car owners and users. Telematics, in essence, converts what
once may have been a “one-time sale” of a vehicle into a continual
service-centered relationship between the manufacturer and its
customer. This use of telematics is likely to increase the elements
of trust and dependency discussed above.
The tethering effect results, to a large extent, from the growing
variety of connected services that new technologies enable manufacturers to offer their customers. Yet, as with the history of the car
industry and sales contracts, this effect may be further reinforced

84. Id. at 34, 41–43, 50.
85. Id. at 16 (“As Ford, GM, and Chrysler each claimed a quarter- or a third-stake in the
market, their future profits depended on sustaining consumers’ repeat purchases or loyalty.”).
86. See Tong, supra note 81, at 23 (describing qualitative empirical research conducted
that showed how “brand associations” were created, as consumers researched vehicle safety
and continued to buy from the same brand of cars that they trusted as safe).
87. See CLARKE, supra note 83, at 3–4.
88. Christopher Hoofnagle, Aniket Kesari & Aaron Perzanowski, The Tethered Economy,
87 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 783, 785 (2019).
89. See, e.g., Nick Statt, Tesla Remotely Disables Autopilot on Used Model S After It Was Sold,
THE VERGE (Feb. 6, 2020, 8:03 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2020/2/6/21127243
/tesla-model-s-autopilot-disabled-remotely-used-car-update.
90. See, e.g., MCKINSEY & CO., supra note 77, at 23 (noting that manufacturers are using
car data analytics, among other things, to improve the link between dealers and customers);
see also supra note 73 and accompanying text.
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by the use of certain contractual practices. A smart car, by definition, contains multiple software components, and those are generally protected by copyright law and merely licensed to the car own91
er by the manufacturer. Software licenses often impose various
restrictions and limitations on the use of the product in which the
software is embedded and thereby restrict the ability of customers
to enjoy what they would otherwise be entitled to as property own92
ers. Among other things, software licenses often limit repair and
modification, ban reverse engineering, and forbid the use of competing products or services. 93 Such provisions clearly have a direct
impact on the ability and motivation of car owners to tinker with
their cars and dissuade attempts to repair them either inde94
pendently or by using third party services. But such contractual
restrictions also work indirectly to tighten the relationship between
the customer and the company in a manner that could make the
latter’s messages regarding maintenance and repair particularly
impactful.
2. The Captive Consumer and Information Asymmetry
An additional factor to consider, on top of the unique relationship between the consumer and the manufacturer, is the location
of the consumer when telematics-based messaging is delivered.
With a telematics system installed in the car, manufacturers can use
it (and are increasingly likely to do so) to deliver the diagnosis result and any accompanying instructions or advice to the driver in
95
real time, via the car’s two-way voice system or media screen. No-

91. See Hoofnagle et al., supra note 88, at 798 (noting that sellers insist that copies of
software are merely licensed even when software is embedded in a device purchased by the
consumer); Lily Hay Newman, Who Owns the Software in the Car You Bought?, SLATE (May 22,
2015, 2:37 PM), https://slate.com/technology/2015/05/gm-and-john-deere-say-they-stillown-the-software-in-cars-customers-buy.html [https://perma.cc/G52Y-SSKD] (noting in the
car industry context that General Motors and John Deere claim, based on their copyright on
the software embedded in their vehicles, that car owners’ license to operate the vehicle is
subject to warranty limitations, disclaimers and all other contractual limitations).
92. See discussion infra Section III.C.
93. See, e.g., Hoofnagle et al., supra note 88, at 796; see also infra Section III.C.
94. Relatedly, some manufacturers attempt to limit warranty coverage in the event consumers utilize an independent repair service or attempt to do it themselves. See, e.g., Auto.
Oil Change Ass’n, Re: FTC Call for Comments Related to Nixing the Fix: A Workshop on Repair Restrictions, FTC 1, 12 (Sept. 16, 2019), https://www.regulations.gov/document/FTC-20190013-0083 (click on “Download” under “AOCA Comments to FTC Nixing the Fix”) [https:
//perma.cc/7QGV-VLDL] [hereinafter AOCA Submission].
95. See, e.g., Automotive Delivery Services Platform, AT&T DRIVE, https://drive.att.com/
(last visited Mar. 1, 2020) (describing the “Natural Voice Command & Control” as communicating with drivers); OnStar Members Tell Their Stories, ONSTAR, https://www.onstar.com
/us/en/stories [https://perma.cc/VV2H-7NCX] (last visited Mar. 1, 2020) (quoting a
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tably, even communications that are delivered to the consumer in
the form of an email, text message, or app push notification would
be read or heard by the driver in many cases while she is in the car.
This manner of communication would surely affect the way consumers process the information being delivered. It is likely the case
that a consumer can weigh options more thoughtfully when she is
at home in front of her computer. The use of in-car communications regarding the need for repair or maintenance may increase
their impact and the sense of urgency, which could cause the consumer to take care of the matter immediately, even if it is not necessary—and, most likely, through the manufacturer’s authorized
network.
Most importantly, it is unclear whether the consumer will have
an effective option to turn off these notifications (or a subset of
them) or mute them. Some sources note, for example, that Tesla’s
consumers are only offered a binary choice right now—an all-ornothing use of the embedded telematics system, rather than a
96
more nuanced menu of choices. Moreover, choosing to deactivate the system in its entirety may result, as specified in Tesla’s Privacy Policy, in “reduced functionality, serious damage, or inoperability, and it may also disable many features of your vehicle . . . .”97
Under such terms, it is likely that most consumers would not opt
out of the Tesla telematics service out of fear of “missing out” on
important safety updates.
Given this, the constitutional “captive audience” doctrine could
98
be applicable to the situation these consumers may face. While
the government generally possesses a fairly narrow authority to
regulate speech, under the captive audience doctrine, a “captive”
listener’s right to not be exposed to speech may trump the speak99
er’s right to convey speech. The concerns associated with the consumer’s potential inability, when sitting in her own car, to choose
not to hear the information arguably evokes the same concerns
member as stating, “I just remember hearing a voice . . . I felt like someone was there with
me”).
96. See, e.g., MEMA Submission, supra note 43, at 15.
97. See Legal: Privacy, TESLA, https://www.tesla.com/about/legal (click on “Learn
More” under “Information We May Collect”) (last visited Dec. 24, 2020).
98. See Pub. Utils. Comm’n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 468 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(“The streetcar audience is a captive audience. It is there as a matter of necessity, not of
choice.”); Charles L. Black, Jr., He Cannot Choose but Hear: The Plight of the Captive Auditor, 53
COLUM. L. REV. 960, 960–61 (1953) (reviewing the Supreme Court case of Public Utilities
Commission v. Pollak); Marcy Strauss, Redefining the Captive Audience Doctrine, 19 HASTINGS
CON. L.Q. 85, 85–86 (1991) (citing to Kovacs v. Cooper as one of the early Supreme Court
cases finding in favor of the captive audience, but lamenting the unclear contours of the
doctrine).
99. See, e.g., Caroline Mala Corbin, The First Amendment Right Against Compelled Listening,
89 B.U. L. REV. 939, 943 (2009).
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discussed in court cases where the “captive audience” was protect100
ed.
In addition to the method of communication, the type of information that is communicated to the consumers via the telematics
system further increases the need for regulatory attention in this
arena. Repair and maintenance of cars are generally conceived of
as matters that affect the safety of the car. While not every repair or
maintenance task recommended by a telematics system would be
urgent or highly concerning (for example, an oil change), the average consumer may find it difficult to distinguish between the system’s notifications. Most of the information is technical in nature,
and a large information gap exists between the average consumer
and car industry professionals. The inability of the average consumer to evaluate the nature of the problem triggering the notification would naturally make the consumer more prone to act as
prescribed by the recommendations without operating much discretion. A general sense of urgency and a tendency to act pursuant
to the system’s recommendation could be reinforced by the “scientific” nature of the system, which relies on real time data extracted
from the car.
Notably, the use of telematics to provide notifications regarding
required repairs and maintenance could help consumers overcome their natural tendency to procrastinate when it comes to
101
these types of tasks. With a telematics system notifying the driver
of the need to repair her car along with information regarding
where she can do this and a convenient option to book the ap102
pointment right away, procrastination could be significantly diminished. While this is beneficial, an unfortunate side effect could
be a further increase in the impact of the communications on consumers, making it more likely that they would pursue repair and
maintenance in facilities owned or linked to the manufacturer
without considering the alternatives. These practices could thus result in a significant decrease of competition in markets for car re103
pairs.

100. See Strauss, supra note 98, at 91–95 (discussing relevant cases).
101. Unlike an intentional avoidance of a task, procrastination usually involves postponing performance of a task that one does intend to pursue—resulting in undesirable delay or
even non-performance. See Eyal Zamir, Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir & Ilana Ritov, It’s Now or
Never! Using Deadlines as Nudges, 42 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 769, 772 (2017).
102. See, e.g., MCKINSEY & CO., supra note 77, at 23 (noting that manufacturers enable
real-time, remote booking of vehicle check-ups).
103. This effect could be intensified where repair and recalls are linked. Typically, manufacturer recalls need to be conducted by the manufacturer at an authorized repair center,
and are done for free as an incentive to the consumers to have their car fixed. For example,
the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration has put out “tips” to manufacturers in
order to increase the rate of recall completion. Some of these tips direct manufacturers to
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Moreover, when directing the consumer to repair the problem
at an authorized dealership, it is likely that the system would not
mention or propose any other options to the driver—certainly not
concrete options in the proximity of the driver—and perhaps
would even use language that implies that other options are irrele104
vant. The consumer could be aware of having other options to
repair her car outside the circle of the manufacturer’s authorized
dealerships, yet the method and manner by which the repair information is provided to the consumer, along with the possibility
for an “instant fix,” may have a powerful impact on the driver that
decreases the chances that the driver would resort to other options.
Furthermore, consumers receiving telematics-based information
may believe that independent repair shops would not have the
requisite information about the problem even if the driver tried to
use their services. Independent repair shops report they increasingly cannot access diagnostic information channeled through the
105
telematics system. Indeed, the telematics system embedded in a
car sends diagnostics information only to the manufacturer and its
106
authorized dealers. To the extent consumers are aware of the
possibility that independent mechanics may not have full access to
such information, they may believe (rightly so) that diagnosis and
repair at independent facilities would either be impossible or less
efficient and more costly. Naturally, this could strengthen the tendency to pursue the manufacturer’s offer without searching for
other options.
All in all, the factors identified above are likely to have a cumulative effect. The power of a manufacturer’s communications emanating from the telematics system could have an overwhelming
impact on the consumer. As a result of these practices, a consumer
could decide to repair her car at an authorized dealership while a
rational decision may have been to fix it elsewhere at some later
point. For this reason, policy makers must pay close attention to
the growing use of telematics-based advertisement of repair and
maintenance services in order to evaluate the need to employ cer-

utilize personalized and “branded” messaging. NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ASS’N, TIPS
FOR INCREASING RECALL COMPLETION RATES, https://www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.dot.gov
/files/documents/13990-recall_best_practices-041119-v2a-tag.pdf [https://perma.cc/ALP5NCRP].
104. See infra note 118.
105. See Where We Live, supra note 54.
106. Car manufacturers claim that they are still providing access to independent repair
shops through such systems under the MOU, but this is rebutted by independent repair
shops. See id. For a detailed discussion of the problematic aspects of the manufacturers’ control of the diagnostic information produced by cars, see infra Part III.
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tain measures that would preserve competition in the relevant
markets and protect consumers from being misled, deceived, or
coerced by these practices.
B. Looking to Consumer Protection Law for Possible Solutions
As stated above, the new developments in diagnostics and
telematics have potentially great benefits—the main one of which
is enhancing safety by promoting preventive maintenance and
timely repairs. Therefore, this Article does not call for the adoption of aggressive regulatory measures in this context, and certainly
not an outright ban of telematics-based advertising. Due to the early stage of the telematics-based advertising industry, there is also a
large measure of uncertainty as to the industry’s future directions.
As a result, this Article’s proposals are of a tentative nature at this
stage.
The body of law that seems most suitable to deal with the issues
triggered by telematics-based advertising is consumer protection
107
law. Under 15 U.S.C. § 45(a), unfair methods of competition in
or affecting commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in
or affecting commerce are considered unlawful, and the FTC is
108
empowered and directed to prevent their use. Looking first at
the second prong of § 45(a), which constitutes the basis for false
advertising law, the question arises: Could the practices described
above be characterized as a type of deceptive advertising?
1. False Advertising
At first look, one may wonder whether communications regarding the need to maintain and repair cars are to be considered a
form of advertising at all. It would be one thing if car manufacturers were merely providing information about the status of the car
and pointing out the need for repairs or maintenance without trying to market their own products and services. Yet, to the extent
that the communications delivered by the telematics system promote the manufacturer’s business and seek to pitch its products
and services to the driver, this Article contends that such commu107. Cf. Hoofnagle et al., supra note 88, at 862 (noting that consumer protection law focuses on individual harms and consumer rights but can also broadly promote functioning
free markets and innovation).
108. Alongside federal law, there are state consumer protection laws, which mirror this
prohibition of unfair or deceptive trade practices. See REBECCA TUSHNET & ERIC GOLDMAN,
ADVERTISING AND MARKETING LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 81 (4th ed. 2019).
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nications should be considered advertising and evaluated as such
by the responsible authorities. Classifying something as advertising
109
may not always be straightforward, but policy makers should employ flexibility in this regard and devote regulatory attention to
110
new practices of attention-getting. As noted by Professor Rebecca
Tushnet in a different context: “Advertising is protean where law is
not. But advertising is not special that way; the problem of adapting to new variants of behavior, some shaped precisely to avoid
111
regulation, is a typical one and need not defeat the law.”
Classifying telematics-based communications by manufacturers
as a form of advertising, or more generally as “commercial speech,”
has importance not only in bringing such speech under the purview of false advertising law but also, more generally, in determining the level of First Amendment scrutiny to which the regulation
112
of these practices would be subject. To the extent the practices
discussed in this Article are essentially a form of advertising, any
regulation of such practices could most likely pass constitutional
113
muster more easily.
Assuming now, for purposes of this discussion, that telematicsbased notifications by car manufacturers could indeed be considered a form of advertising, a separate inquiry under false advertising law has to do with whether such notifications have a deceptive
nature. Clearly, not all of them do, but some may. Generally speaking, the relevant question is how consumers perceive the advertis114
er’s message. This is, of course, dependent not only on the substantive content but also on the way the message is phrased and
conveyed, the medium used to deliver the message, and other rele115
vant circumstances. As the practices of different companies are
not identical and are naturally subject to constant changes, this

109. Id. at 12.
110. See Rebecca Tushnet, Attention Must Be Paid: Commercial Speech, User-Generated Ads,
and the Challenge of Regulation, 58 BUFF. L. REV. 721, 723, 731 (2010) (discussing the need to
devote attention under false advertising law to new practices of attention-getting); Alexandra J. Roberts, False Influencing, 109 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2020) (discussing the need to
regulate influencer marketing as a type of advertising).
111. Tushnet, supra note 110, at 791.
112. Commercial speech is more generally regulated than other types of speech and receives reduced constitutional protection. TUSHNET & GOLDMAN, supra note 108, at 12. While
false advertising is not protected by the First Amendment at all, regulation of nonmisleading commercial speech is subject to an intermediate level of First Amendment scrutiny, in contrast to the strict scrutiny framework that applies to other types of speech. See
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980); TUSHNET &
GOLDMAN, supra note 108, at 20.
113. See also supra notes 98–100 and accompanying text (discussing the “captive audience” doctrine, which may serve to further justify regulation of speech in this context).
114. TUSHNET & GOLDMAN, supra note 108, at 9.
115. See id. at 6 (“[C]onsumer response to advertising varies based on the advertising
medium.”).
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type of determination cannot be done in a general manner. The
deception could be, for instance, in regard to the level of urgency
or importance of performing the repair or the need to perform it
at the specified facility associated with the manufacturer.
Notably, the definition of deception in the context of false ad116
vertising law is not confined to claims that are explicitly false;
117
omitting information can be deceptive as well. In the context
discussed herein, the failure to propose, or even to mention the
existence of, other options where consumers can perform a required maintenance or repair task may have a significant impact
on them. This omission can undermine consumers’ freedom to
choose where to repair their cars, even though they typically hold
general knowledge about such options. Thus, this may be consid118
ered a deceptive omission in this context.
Another element of deception that may be exhibited in telematics-based communications could relate to their very nature as advertisements. As noted above, these communications may not
come off at all as advertising on their face, and many consumers
may simply not be aware of the fact that they are essentially receiving a promotional message. This is problematic, as consumers may
regularly employ certain filters with respect to advertising but are
not likely to do so when encountering a new form of advertising
119
that is disguised as something else. For this reason, making sure
that consumers are aware of their exposure to advertising is highly
120
important. In the context discussed herein, masking the promotional nature of the communications at hand can also make them
appear more authoritative (like a doctor’s prescription) in the eyes
of the consumer and obscures the fact that the consumer may actually have leeway in choosing when and where to fix her car.
Altogether, when evaluating telematics-based advertising of repair and maintenance services, policy makers must consider the
context and the unique characteristics of these practices that could

116. Id. at 101.
117. Id.
118. Cf. AOCA Submission, supra note 94, at 14 (noting, as an example for a restrictive
practice, Hyundai 2017 Elantra owner’s manual command form language: “Have engine oil
and filter changed by an authorized Hyundai dealer . . . ,” which is not accompanied by an
acknowledgement of the consumer’s option to use any other service provider).
119. See Tushnet, supra note 110, at 730 (describing the market dynamics leading to advertisers employing “methods that don’t let audiences know an ad is coming” and noting
that our filters can be defeated by such new forms of advertising).
120. See id. at 731; Eric Goldman, A Coasean Analysis of Marketing, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 1151,
1189 (2006) (quoting Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 317 F.2d 669, 674 (2d Cir.
1963)) (stating that consumers “routinely say that they want to know when content is marketing”).
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make this form of advertising extremely powerful—perhaps even
121
close to coercive.
2. Unfair Practices
As noted above, the FTC is not only authorized to enforce
122
against deception but also against “unfair” trade acts. Unfairness
requires that “the act or practice causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by
consumers themselves and not out-weighed by countervailing ben123
efits to consumers or to competition.” Thus, even practices that
do not count as deceptive advertising need to be evaluated for
their fairness. On top of the factors and circumstances highlighted
above, in evaluating the manufacturers’ practices from a fairness
perspective, it is essential to keep in mind other ways in which car
manufacturers restrict or limit third-party repairs—for instance, by
124
registering and enforcing design patents over replacement parts.
Notably, the FTC has recently started to study restrictions on re125
pairs. Due to the importance of preserving a meaningful right to
126
repair, the FTC should expand its efforts in this vein and oversee
the use of telematics to ensure that it does not end up suppressing
auto repairs.
3. Other Legislative Measures
Alongside the general jurisdiction of the FTC (and comparable
state agencies) to regulate deceptive and unfair practices, it might
be advisable to consider enacting specific consumer protection legislation to regulate certain aspects of the practices described above.
The law could require, for instance, that the interface design allows consumers to easily search for other repair options. In addition, it could impose some type of a disclosure requirement regarding the promotional nature of the communications emanating

121. For the need to evaluate advertising in its context, see TUSHNET & GOLDMAN, supra
note 108, at 143. See also Avis Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc. v. Hertz. Corp., 782 F.2d 381 (2d Cir.
1986) (noting that a court must view the entire mosaic of the advertisement rather than
each tile separately).
122. See TUSHNET & GOLDMAN, supra note 108, at 53 and accompanying text.
123. 15 U.S.C. § 45(n); see also TUSHNET & GOLDMAN, supra note 108, at 53.
124. See supra note 55.
125. See FTC Workshop, supra note 19. As an example for repair restrictions in the automobile industry, see AOCA Submission, supra note 94, which details various types of repair
restrictions.
126. For discussion, see supra Section I.A.
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127

from the telematics system. In addition, it might be sensible to
require that the cost of services advertised by the system be conspicuously presented to consumers. Another dimension that the
law could address is the method of communication. Policy makers
should consider disallowing certain forms of in-car messaging, to
the extent this can be done without compromising the functionality of the system. Additionally, a more meaningful choice should be
provided to consumers regarding the type of notifications they re128
ceive and their method of delivery.
Unfortunately, manufacturers are not only enjoying a significant
marketing advantage as a result of their control of telematics systems but are also making competition much harder by restricting
access to diagnostic information. Part III discusses this in detail.
III. ACCESS FOR ALL: THE NEED TO ACCESS TELEMATICS
As discussed above in Part I, Massachusetts passed an automobile right to repair law in 2012. 129 Following this legislation, car
makers and repair shops entered into a national MOU that standardized the way car diagnostic information could be accessed by all
130
mechanics, authorized or independent. Now that the MOU is in
place, manufacturer diagnostic tools, including the software and
diagnostic codes, must be available for purchase on “fair and rea131
sonable terms.” The level of compliance with the MOU apparent132
ly varies between different car makers. In addition, transaction
costs for shop owners can be high, particularly when they service
more than one brand of car, requiring them to search for available
133
information on each manufacturer’s website and purchase a va-

127. See supra notes 119–20 and accompanying text; Tushnet, supra note 110, at 728
(noting that commercial speakers can be forced to disclose relevant information to avoid
consumer deception).
128. As noted above, this is not the current situation, at least with respect to certain
manufacturers. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
129. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93K (2019); see also Ng, supra note 49.
130. See A “Right to Repair” Movement Tools Up, THE ECONOMIST (Sept. 30, 2017), https:
//www.economist.com/business/2017/09/30/a-right-to-repair-movement-tools-up [https:
//perma.cc/H5ZS-SHYP ] (“The hope is that once an important state passes such a law, the
country will follow—as was the case in the car industry after Massachusetts in 2012 passed a
right to repair law for cars that led to a national memorandum of understanding between
carmakers and repair shops.”).
131. MOU, supra note 9.
132. See Schueller, supra note 47 (noting that most members are “attempting to comply
on some level,” but some “were reluctant to follow the MOU and chose to be selective in
what software they offered”).
133. Notably, though, for vehicles manufactured in 2018 and beyond, under Section
2(c) to the MOU, supra note 9, OEMs must provide access to the diagnostic information by
utilizing a vehicle communications interface that would act as a universal scan tool that will
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riety of diagnostic tools and individual subscriptions for each man134
ufacturer’s software. Yet, all in all, the industry has moved a long
way towards reaching a status quo that seemed to have been mostly
satisfying for all parties involved.
Now, with the spread of telematics, the concern is that this equilibrium is about to change. As noted above, in the last few years,
more and more new models of cars are manufactured with a
telematics system, enabling wireless transmission of data between
135
the car and the manufacturer. With a telematics system embedded in the vehicle, diagnostic data from various car modules could
be gathered in a gateway and sent directly to the manufacturer, in
136
an encrypted format, while remaining non-accessible to others.
Information transmitted via the telematics system cannot be easily
extracted from the vehicle by third parties, not only because it is
encrypted but also for lack of standardization in the hardware and
137
software components of telematics systems.
And, unfortunately, the 2012 Massachusetts law and MOU do
not accommodate or respond to this development and do not
138
guarantee access to wirelessly-transmitted data. The manufacturers’ current obligations to provide standardized access to diagnostic information do not apply to “telematics services or any other
remote or information service, diagnostic or otherwise, delivered
139
to or derived from a motor vehicle by mobile communications.”
There is an exception to this carve-out, obligating the manufacturers to provide access to the extent it is “necessary to diagnose and
repair a customer’s vehicle and not otherwise available to an independent repair facility” via the diagnostic tools offered to purchase
140
by the manufacturer. The term “necessary,” however, could plausibly be construed narrowly by manufacturers to exclude various
types of repair and diagnostic information. In addition, absent access to the telematic feed, it could be difficult to discern what information manufacturers fail to provide access to, and as a result,
detecting and proving a breach of the manufacturers’ obligations
extract repair diagnostic codes from any make or model, and thus eliminate the need for
the purchase of OEM diagnostics scanning tools.
134. And hence, the need for universal scanning tools that can be used for diagnosis of
vehicles made by different manufacturers. This was the nature of the tool developed by
Autel, which triggered the litigation discussed infra notes 178–88 and accompanying text.
135. See, e.g., Glenn Wilder, Opinion, Your View: Right to Repair Needs Update, PATRIOT
LEDGER (June 6, 2019), https://www.patriotledger.com/opinion/20190606/your-view-rightto-repair-needs-update [https://perma.cc/T92U-D76K ] (expecting that by 2020, “more
than 90 percent of new cars will transmit real-time repair information wirelessly”).
136. See, e.g., MEMA Submission, supra note 43, at 14.
137. See supra notes 60–61 and accompanying text.
138. Section 2(e) of the R2R Agreement attached to the MOU, supra note 9.
139. Id.
140. Id.
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could be challenging. Some independent mechanics report their
struggle to access diagnostic information they once had access to is
triggering serious and wide-spread concern that the switch to
telematics is making the MOU and the 2012 Massachusetts law ob141
solete.
Utilizing new technological developments to avoid the spirit of
the law and the governing private ordering regime should not be
permitted. In order to deal with this emerging reality, states need
to update automobile repair legislation and mandate that car
manufacturers supply standardized access to telematics and software on reasonable terms. In addition, as the discussion below will
explore, lawmakers should consider certain changes to intellectual
property laws so that manufacturers cannot use them as another
means to bar access to their telematics systems and diagnostic data.
Enabling reasonable access to diagnostics would not only allow
independent repair shops to operate but could also lessen the anticompetitive impact resulting from the manufacturers’ control of
142
the telematics system for marketing purposes. Currently, drivers
may simply rule out the possibility of taking their cars to independent repair shops, knowing that such shops do not have access
to diagnostics. Enabling third parties to access diagnostics may
cause drivers to consider other options more often, even in the
face of aggressive marketing on behalf of the original manufacturers.
A. Updating Automobile Repair Legislation
Considering all the above, this Article supports the new amendments that update Massachusetts’s 2012 right to repair law to better address the growing use of telematics in vehicle diagnostics and
143
repair. Given that Massachusetts voters approved such legislation

141. See Where We Live, supra note 54 (interviewing independent mechanic); Baystate
Business: Police Reform, BLOOMBERG, at 18:42 (June 11, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com
/news/audio/2020-06-11/baystate-business-police-reform-radio; supra notes 67–68 and accompanying text.
142. See discussion supra Part II.
143. Massachusetts voters approved a ballot initiative in November 2020 to amend the
2012 law. Brandon Bigelow & Dallin Wilson, Mass. Voters Expand Right to Repair Law: Is Past
Prologue or Will OEMs Be Forced to Fight Back?, JD SUPRA (Nov. 12, 2020), https:
//www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/mass-voters-expand-right-to-repair-law-33686
[https://
perma.cc/SKG5-547N]. The ballot initiative is almost identical to a 2019 bill: An Act to Enhance, Update and Protect the 2013 Motor Vehicle Right to Repair Law and Consumer
Rights, H. 340, 191st Gen Ct. (Mass. 2019). Because the state legislature did not pass the bill
by the end of the term, Bill H.340, MALEGISLATURE.GOV, https://malegislature.gov/Bills
/191/H340 (last visited Dec. 26, 2020), proponents of the update instead managed to put
the law on the November ballot for Massachusetts voters to vote on during the 2020

WINTER 2021]

Smart Cars, Telematics and Repair

313

in November 2020, other states may follow suit, or an amended
144
MOU with the car industry could emerge.
The core provision of the amendments would eliminate the
145
telematics carve-out described above and require a manufacturer
of vehicles that utilizes a telematics system, starting with model year
2022 and thereafter, to equip such vehicles with an “inter-operable,
standardized and open access platform across all of the manufac146
turer’s makes and models.” The amendments clarify that “[s]uch
platform shall be capable of securely communicating all mechanical data emanating directly from the motor vehicle via direct data
147
connection to the platform.” This secure platform “shall be directly accessible by the owner of the vehicle through a mobile148
based application.” An “owner” of a vehicle is defined, in the
original Massachusetts act, as a person or business who owns or
149
leases the vehicle. Most importantly, an owner would also have a
right to authorize an independent repair facility to access the vehicle’s mechanical data for the purposes of maintaining, diagnosing,
150
or repairing the vehicle. To avoid any doubt, the amendments
also clarify that “[a]ccess shall include the ability to send commands to in-vehicle components if needed for purposes of mainte151
nance, diagnostics and repair.”
Having these amendments adopted by the Massachusetts voters
goes a long way towards maintaining the ability of independent repair shops to access diagnostic data in Massachusetts. While this
Article supports this direction, it does not opine on whether the

elections. See CTR. FOR STATE POL’Y ANALYSIS, A GUIDE TO MASSACHUSETTS QUESTION 1:
EXPANDING THE RIGHT TO REPAIR LAW 3 (Oct. 2020), https://tischcollege.tufts.edu/sites
/default/files/cSPA_right_to_repair.pdf [https://perma.cc/A96Y-8TC4]. Given that the bill
and the ballot initiative are almost the same, this section will not differentiate between the
two and uses the term “law” to reference both the bill and the initiative. Although the initiative was passed by Massachusetts voters in the November 2020 election, the legislature could
still take action to amend the new law. See id. at 5; Bigelow & Wilson, supra.
144. But see Bigelow & Wilson, supra note 143 (expressing doubts as to the likelihood of
striking a nation-wide deal by the time the amendments are set to become effective).
145. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
146. H.340 § 3. The proposed bill and the ballot initiative have slightly different definitions of what a telematics system constitutes. The following is the definition of a “telematics
system” as provided for in the ballot initiative: “any system in a motor vehicle that collects
information generated by the operation of the vehicle and transmits such information, in
this chapter referred to as ‘telematics system data,’ utilizing wireless communications to a
remote receiving point where it is stored.” SEC’Y. OF THE COMMONWEALTH, MASSACHUSETTS
INFORMATION FOR VOTERS: 2020 BALLOT QUESTIONS 5 (2020), https://www.sec.state.ma.us
/ele/elepdf/IFV_2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/A8JS-J24Z].
147. Id. “Mechanical Data” is defined in section 1 as “any telematics data in a vehicle related to the diagnosis, repair or maintenance of that vehicle.”
148. H.340 § 3.
149. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93K, § 1 (2019).
150. H.340 § 3.
151. Id.
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law’s specific solution—a secure platform and a mobile-based application—is necessarily the best way to address the concern regarding hindered access to diagnostic information. It might very
well be, but this Article does not rule out the possibility that there
may be other good technological solutions to alleviate this concern. In addition, some aspects not yet addressed by the amendments perhaps should be considered, including the possibility of
allowing third parties to market their repair and maintenance services via the platform to the same extent authorized dealers are
permitted to do so.
While one of the goals of the new law is to spur similar amendments to the nationwide MOU, if, for some reason, this does not
happen, a more modest alternative should be considered. For instance, even if they do not get real-time access to telematics diagnostic information, consumers and independent mechanics should
nonetheless be permitted to connect to the telematics system after
the fact. In order to reduce costs, this connection should preferably be done through a standard non-proprietary interface that
connects to a vehicle’s telematics gateway. While this would not
eliminate the competitive advantage of the manufacturers resulting from their exclusive access to real-time information, such a solution would at least enable independent mechanics to extract all
relevant data if and when the vehicle arrives at their shop. Similarly, an amended MOU could clarify and explicitly require that all
telematics information useful for diagnosis and repair be made
152
available through the OBD port.
B. Intellectual Property Law Considerations
Critically, in order to effectively promote competitive access to
diagnostic and repair information, it may not be sufficient to enact
state consumer protection laws, as certain intellectual property implications must be considered as well. 153 This Section addresses
such potential implications in connection with two different
branches of intellectual property law: copyright law and trademark
law.

152. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
153. For a thorough treatment of the interface between intellectual property law and the
right to repair consumer products, see Grinvald & Tur-Sinai, supra note 20, at 90–123.
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1. Copyright Law
Markedly, software components of a telematics-based system for
154
diagnostics are likely to be subject to copyright protection. In
addition to the software, various data compilations contained in
the system could be protected, provided that the “selection, coordination, and arrangement” of the data meet the originality re155
quirement of copyright law. Hence, in requiring access to the
telematics system and data, the new Massachusetts law might implicate federal copyright law. Notably, when a state law attempts to
circumvent or interfere with the underlying goals of a federal law,
156
preemption concerns may arise.
Likely more concerning, however, is that manufacturers can utilize copyright law, along with contractual restrictions, to effectively
157
bar access to components of their systems. To the extent there is
a gap between diagnostic and repair data available to manufacturers and those available to consumers and independent repair
shops, independent mechanics can only continue operating by independently retrieving data from vehicles using third party diag158
nostic tools. Yet, any unauthorized copying or adaptation of copyrighted software or other components by independent shops or
159
tools developers may trigger copyright liability.
154. It is possible that patents may also protect similar items.
155. Feist Publ’ns v. Rural Telephone Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 359 (1991); see also Auto
Care Ass’n, supra note 61 (arguing that “data collected through telematics systems is creatively arranged to support innovative telematics systems”). Notably, the underlying data are
not protected by copyright and may be freely copied. Feist Publ’ns, 499 U.S. at 360. As to
ownership of data, see also discussion infra Section IV.B.
156. Under the preemption doctrine, in case of a conflict between a state law and a federal one, the federal law controls and the state law must be struck down as preempted. See,
e.g., Camilla A. Hrdy, The Reemergence of State Anti-Patent-Laws, 89 U. COLO. L. REV. 133, 158
(2018) (“ ‘Preemption’ generally describes a situation in which federal law ‘preempts,’ or
supersedes, a state or local law.”); Dmitry Karshtedt, Contracting for a Return to the USPTO:
Inter Partes Reexaminations as the Exclusive Outlet for Licensee Challenges to Patent Validity, 51
IDEA 309, 317 (2011) (noting that under the preemption doctrine, in case of a conflict between federal and state law, the federal law controls and the state law is invalidated).
Preemption analysis is typically conducted under the Supremacy Clause of Article VI of the
Constitution, which provides that the laws of the United States “shall be the Supreme Law of
the Land . . . any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any state to the Contrary notwithstanding.” U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. Notably, the 2012 Massachusetts Right to Repair Act
already implicated federal copyright law in a similar manner (to the extent it obligates manufacturers to make available copyrighted software), and we are not aware of any constitutional challenges that have been raised in this respect.
157. See discussion infra Section III.C.
158. The availability of third-party tools could also be highly beneficial for independent
shops even if proprietary diagnostic tools capable of extracting all necessary data are offered
for purchase by manufacturers, as such tools can typically operate across multiple platforms,
and thus save the need to purchase separate tools and software subscriptions. See supra note
69 and accompanying text.
159. This issue has come up in the Ford v. Autel litigation discussed infra notes 178–88
and accompanying text.
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Although copyright law recognizes an exemption for the copying or adaptation of software that is created as an essential step in
connection with its use, this exemption does not seem to include
160
the scenarios discussed in this Article. Furthermore, this exemption is restricted to copies made or authorized by the owner of a
copy of a computer program, and vehicle owners are not likely the
161
owners of the software copies embedded in their cars. In fact,
makers of devices that rely on embedded software code for their
functionality, including cars, often preserve ownership in copies of
162
the software, while device owners are considered mere licensees.
This position has been adopted, for instance, by John Deere and
163
General Motors with respect to their vehicles. Similarly, in a
comment to the Copyright Office, the Auto Alliance recently maintained that many telematics systems are subject to license agreements that “clearly show the user does not own the copyrighted
164
software.” Courts have backed up this position by upholding license agreements specifying that a software user does not own the
165
copy but is merely a licensee. Thus, it seems that consumers, repair shops, and independent tool makers who copy elements of
proprietary diagnostic software, even in the course of repair, are
not covered by the Copyright Act’s software exemptions. It is also
not clear whether § 107 of the Copyright Act (the “fair use” provi166
sion) would be applicable in these cases; and due to the inherent
uncertainty involved in fair use determination, it certainly cannot
167
be relied upon by any of the parties we are concerned with.

160. 17 U.S.C. § 117(a)(1). Another provision in the Copyright Act includes a specific
repair exemption that allows the owner of a machine to make copies of software in the
course of maintaining or repairing the machine. See id. § 117(c). It is unlikely that a consumer or independent mechanic would be copying the car’s software in the course of repairing the car. A more likely scenario for copying of diagnostic software would be a third
party attempting to develop diagnostic tools, and such attempts would not fall within this
exemption.
161. See Hoofnagle et al., supra note 88, at 798 (noting that rights under Section 117 of
the Copyright Act are limited to owners of copies of software).
162. Id.
163. Id.; Newman, supra note 91.
164. Auto Care Ass’n, supra note 61, at 11.
165. See, e.g., Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102, 1111–12 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding
that a software user is a licensee rather than an owner of a software program where the copyright owner specifies that the user is granted a license and imposes significant transfer and
use restrictions).
166. Section 107 of the Copyright Act has a four factor test that judges are required to
consider and balance. One of the factors is the impact on the market of the copyrighted
work, here, the software. 17 U.S.C. § 107. Given that there would be an adverse (but procompetitive) impact on the market, this would not necessarily be deemed to be fair use.
167. See, e.g., Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978–
2005, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 575 (2008) (reporting that 30.4% of preliminary injunctions
found in favor of fair use and 24.1% of bench trial opinions did).
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In light of the above, there is a need for action at the federal
level to provide a “safe harbor” from liability (or, at the very least, a
compulsory license regime) for certain uses of copyrighted works
needed to enable vehicle diagnostics and repair, to the extent
manufacturers do not provide reasonable access to such works.
While such a regime would limit the possibility of enforcing copyright against independent repairers and diagnostic tool makers,
manufacturers would still be able to assert their copyright in components of the telematics system against other car manufacturers
incorporating such components in their own systems. In any event,
market exclusivity may not be needed at all to incentivize manufacturers to invest in diagnostic and telematic systems, which allow
them to offer better services to their customers.
Another area of copyright law that needs to be revised to support a competitive diagnostics and repair market is § 1201 of the
Copyright Act, which sets the legal basis on which manufacturers
are able to control access to their telematics systems through the
168
use of TPMs. Even if disabling such locks is technologically feasible, § 1201 prevents anyone from disabling a TPM that a copyright
owner has placed on a work in order to protect its copyrighted
169
works. On top of civil liability, if the disabling of a TPM is done
willfully and for commercial gain, the circumventer may be crimi170
nally liable.
Fortunately, § 1201 authorizes the Librarian of Congress, upon
the recommendation of the Copyright Office, to adopt temporary
exemptions (valid for three years) to these strict prohibitions in
171
certain circumstances. As part of the latest exemptions an172
nounced in 2018, following a thorough rulemaking proceeding,
the Librarian of Congress renewed and expanded an exemption
that allows persons who engage in non-infringing uses of software
contained in, and controlling the function of, a lawfully acquired
motorized land vehicle, to circumvent TPMs for purposes of diag173
nosis, repair, or modification of a vehicle function. As part of the
renewed exemption, the Librarian of Congress removed a limitation prohibiting circumvention of TPMs to access computer pro168. See supra note 62 and accompanying text; Auto Care Ass’n, supra note 61 (discussing
the burden posed by the current access to TPMs on independent servicers).
169. 17 U.S.C. § 1201.
170. Id. § 1204.
171. Id. § 1201.
172. See Section 1201 Exemptions to Prohibition Against Circumvention of Technological
Measures Protecting Copyrighted Works, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF. (2018), https://www.copyright.gov
/1201/2018 [https://perma.cc/HK8F-3EKU].
173. Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for
Access Control Technologies, 83 Fed. Reg. 54,010, 54,014 (Oct. 26, 2018) (to be codified at
37 C.F.R. pt. 201).
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grams primarily designed for the control of telematics systems.
Thus, disabling TPMs to gain access to diagnostic data from the
telematics module of the car is now permitted for purposes of repair of the car. However, a proposal to expand the exemption so
that it also permits diagnosis, repair, or lawful modification of the
telematics system itself was rejected. This means that tweaking the
telematics system so that it transmits diagnostic information to a
mechanic chosen by the vehicle owner is not permitted under this
exemption.
Although consumers can now legally bypass TPMs on their
telematics systems by virtue of the renewed exemption, this does
not mean that third party mechanics or diagnostic tool makers
could do so as well. While a requirement that circumvention be
“undertaken by the authorized owner” of the vehicle was removed
174
as part of the renewed exemption, the Copyright Office declined
to explicitly extend the exemption to third parties. In fact, disablement of TPMs by independent mechanics and diagnostic tool
makers may implicate § 1201(a)(2) and § 1201(b) of the Copyright
Act (the “DMCA anti-trafficking provisions”), which prohibit the
manufacturing or trafficking of circumvention tools and the provision of circumvention services. Only Congress is authorized to provide exemptions in this respect. Thus, in its recommendation leading to the enactment of the § 1201 exemptions, the Copyright
Office clarified that “[g]iven the legal uncertainty in this area, services electing to proceed with circumvention activity pursuant to
175
the exemption do so at their peril.” This is unfortunate in terms
of enabling a meaningful right to repair. Indeed, the Copyright
Office acknowledged the argument made by repair proponents
that many consumers would not be able to take advantage of the
176
exemption if they were not able to utilize third-party assistance.
Therefore, while the 2018 exemption was a win for the repair
industry, it was a muted win and leaves open room for additional
regulatory intervention. The temporary nature of the exemption is
yet another downside, and the Copyright Office could be persuad177
ed in future years not to renew it. Our analysis supports the con-

174. Id. at 54,022.
175. SECTION 1201 RULEMAKING PROCEEDING, supra note 28, at 225.
176. Id.
177. This concern is not theoretical. On past occasions, the Copyright Office has decided not to renew much needed exemptions, including the “unlocking” exemption that had
been provided from 2006 to 2012 to allow consumers to connect their wireless devices to an
alternative network. See Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for Access Control Technologies, 77 Fed. Reg. 65,260, 65,264–66 (Oct. 26,
2012) (describing the history and subsequent narrowing of the unlocking exemption). It
took an act of Congress to overturn the denial of the exemption. See Unlocking Consumer
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tinuing renewal of the exemption, though ultimately, we call for a
permanent and more encompassing enactment of such an exemption by Congress.
2. Trademark Law
Another area where intellectual property rights could create obstacles to competition in the market for diagnostic tools has to do
with trademark law. One recent case highlights this issue: Ford Motors sued Autel, an independent manufacturer of diagnostic scanners. One of Ford’s allegations claimed Autel infringed upon its
trademarks by including them on the electronic menu screen of its
diagnostic tool along with other logos. Ford argued that this use
causes a likelihood of confusion as to the source of Autel’s diag178
nostic tool. In addition, Ford pleaded dilution through blurring
and tarnishment, due to the associations that Autel’s customers
could make through its diagnostic tool because the use of the Ford
179
logo arguably linked Ford and Autel.
While courts have developed the doctrine of “nominative fair
180
use” in trademark law, and “descriptive fair use” is a statutory de181
fense to trademark infringement, the court did not dismiss the
182
pleadings. These defenses ordinarily allow third parties to utilize
others’ trademarks to the extent necessary to communicate infor183
mation to consumers regarding their businesses. Under these
doctrines, courts have held that using original manufacturers’
word marks in similar contexts—including by repair shops and
184
parts resellers—is noninfringing. Where a use is made of the
original manufacturer’s logo (or “stylized” mark), however, as in
185
Autel’s case, courts more readily find trademark infringement.
Unfortunately, this was likely the message Autel received because

Choice and Wireless Competition Act, Pub. L. No. 113-144, 128 Stat. 1751 (2014) (codified
as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 1201 note (2012 & Supp. V 2018)).
178. Ford Motor Co. v. Autel US Inc., No. 14-13760, 2015 WL 5729067, at *7–8 (E.D.
Mich. Sept. 30, 2015).
179. Ford Motor Co. v. Autel US Inc., No. 14-13760, 2016 WL 3569541, at *5 (E.D. Mich.
July 1, 2016).
180. See Alexandra J. Roberts, Trademark Failure to Function, 104 IOWA L. REV. 1977, 1997
(2019) (describing the nominative fair use defense).
181. 15 U.S.C. § 1115.
182. Ford Motor Co., 2015 WL 5729067, at *9 (noting that the use of Ford’s logo was a
factor leading it to not apply precedential cases and grant Autel’s motion to dismiss).
183. See Toyota Motor Sales v. Tabari, 610 F.3d 1171, 1176–77 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding
that Toyota is not entitled to a wholesale injunction against a broker of genuine Lexus cars).
184. See id.
185. See Hypertherm, Inc. v. Precision Prods., Inc., 832 F.2d 697, 701 (1st Cir. 1987)
(upholding an injunction in part on the defendant’s use of plaintiff’s trade dress).
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186

Autel eventually settled the case with Ford. Ultimately, based on
Autel’s website, it appears that the settlement allowed Autel to con187
tinue to use Ford’s name but not its logo.
Although Autel’s business may not have suffered greatly from
this multi-year litigation, when manufacturers enforce their trademarks against independent repair shops, which are likely to be
small businesses or sole proprietorships, the problem can be exacerbated. While Autel had the wherewithal to likely negotiate for
the ability to use the plain text word “Ford” to indicate its products
were compatible with Ford cars (and which nominative fair use
clearly covers), independent repair shops may not know this or
have access to lawyers who can advise them of this. Therefore,
when they receive cease-and-desist letters claiming that the independent repair shop cannot refer to the manufacturer at all (not
even in plain text), the repair shop owner will likely cede to the
demands in order to not get caught up in a costly and emotional
188
legal battle.
There is serious need for clarity regarding the scope of trademark rights and the consequences of unfounded claims of infringement. Some relief might come in the form of a state law
providing a cause of action to address “abusive threats” made by
189
manufacturers. In addition, in today’s image-heavy world, more
thought needs to be given to judges’ predispositions toward allow190
ing the use of plain text and not of trademark logos. It is questionable whether the use of the plain text allows third parties to
compete as well as other licensed entities who are entitled to use
191
the logos.
C. Regulating Contractual Practices
Contract law provides one area where state legislatures and
courts could be forward-thinking. Given that almost all software
186. Stipulated Motion to Dismiss, Ford Motor Co. v. Autel US Inc, No. 4:14cv13760TGB-MJH (E.D. Mich. Mar. 16, 2017), 2017 WL 4391922.
187. See Database of Coverage of Autel’s Scanners, http://www.maxitpms.com/get
Coverage.jspx (select “US” from the “Market” dropdown) (showing Ford as one of the models under Make and Model); Product Display of MaxiSys, AUTEL ONLINE STORE, https:
//www.autelonline.com/autel-ms908cv-maxisys-cv-heavy-duty-diagnostic-scan-tool-with-j2534-ecu-coding-programming_p76.html [https://perma.cc/XEF4-JWLC] (showing the
names of the car companies, not the logos).
188. See generally Leah Chan Grinvald, Policing the Cease-and-Desist Letter, 49 U.S.F. L. REV.
409, 414–18 (2015) (discussing the cease-and-desist process).
189. See id.
190. See, e.g., Hypertherm, 832 F.2d at 701 (upholding an injunction in part on the defendant’s use of plaintiff’s trade dress).
191. Due to space limitations, this question is left for another day.
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systems are licensed to consumers, there is typically an End User
License Agreement (EULA) attached to it. By using the software
(for example, by purchasing or leasing the vehicle, and then driving the car), a consumer is agreeing to abide by the terms of the
EULA, which often contain use restrictions on how the consumer
should use the software. For example, farm equipment sold by
John Deere is accompanied by a license agreement that prevents
consumers from accessing the software embedded in the equipment and prohibits any repairs other than those made by author192
ized repair providers.
Ford’s lawsuit against Autel also illustrates how manufacturers
193
have utilized these EULAs to protect their systems. In addition to
the trademark infringement and other intellectual property claims,
Ford argued that Autel purchased Ford’s proprietary diagnostic
scanner and used it in violation of the EULA, which prohibited reverse engineering while also providing that an “End-User” cannot
194
be a “diagnostic toolmaker.” Notably, copying or making an adaptation of a copyrighted software program while exceeding the
terms of a software license does not only involve a breach of con195
tract but could also constitute copyright infringement.
Contract law, though, is state-based and also subject to judicial
interpretation. This means that states can curb certain uses of contract they deem to be anti-competitive through measures limiting
what manufacturers can include in their EULAs. In addition, in
light of the strong policy considerations favoring access to diagnostic information, perhaps courts should consider viewing such restrictions as constituting “unclean hands,” or a form of copyright
196
misuse. Finally, certain contractual restrictions that seek to inhibit competition in markets for diagnostic tools and repairs could
run afoul of federal antitrust law as agreements in unlawful re-

192. See Jason Bloomberg, John Deere’s Digital Transformation Runs Afoul of Right-to-Repair
Movement, FORBES (Apr. 30, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jasonbloomberg/20
17/04/30/john-deeres-digital-transformation-runs-afoul-of-right-to-repair-movement [https:
//perma.cc/4WSD-8K68].
193. See supra notes 178–88 and accompanying discussion.
194. Ford Motor Co. v. Autel US Inc., No. 14-13760, 2016 WL 3569541, at *2 (E.D. Mich.
July 1, 2016); see also GM LLC v. Dorman Prods., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135721 (E.D. Mich.
Sept. 30, 2016) (for an argument that copying of software constituted a violation of the governing EULA).
195. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(1)–(2) (providing to the copyright owner the exclusive right to
copy and prepare derivative works from their copyrighted work).
196. For the copyright misuse doctrine, see, for example, Brett Frischman & Dan Moylan, The Evolving Common Law Doctrine of Copyright Misuse: A Unified Theory and Its Application
to Software, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 865 (2000); and Chip Patterson, Copyright Misuse and Modified Copyleft: New Solutions to the Challenges of Internet Standardization, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1351
(2000).
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197

straint of trade. As we have noted, the FTC has begun an investigation into the car repair industry, and hopefully their investiga198
tion will bring solutions to advance competition in this arena.
IV. CHALLENGES AND RESPONSES
We recognize the repair movement is controversial. The efforts
for and against the original Massachusetts repair act were wideranging, and the efforts to pass a revised version (or fight against
199
such passage), have been no different. In this Part, we attempt to
proactively address some of the arguments that could be used to
argue against an expanded right to repair law that would encompass data transmitted via telematics systems.
A. Everything Is a Trade Secret
One of the oft-cited challenges to a right to repair for cars, or
even more broadly, electronics, is that manufacturers would be
forced to disclose trade secrets if legislatures mandated they pro200
vide access to repair information. A trade secret is generally defined as information that: (1) its owner has taken reasonable steps
to keep secret, and (2) derives an actual or potential independent
201
economic value from being a secret. To accommodate this con-

197. See Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012) (“Every contract . . . in restraint of
trade or commerce . . . is declared to be illegal.”). Some commentators have opined that
state antitrust law needs to “parallel” federal law, meaning that what is illegal under federal
antitrust law can be illegal as well under state law. See Richard A. Samp, The Role of State Antitrust Law in the Aftermath of Actavis, 15 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 149, 149–50 (2014). For a history of the relationship between state and federal antitrust law, see generally Herbert
Hovenkamp, State Antitrust in the Federal Scheme, 58 IND. L.J. 375 (1983).
198. As noted above, the FTC has authority to investigate and pursue actions against entities engaging in unfair competitive practices, as well as those that harm consumers. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
199. Right to Repair collected over 100,000 signatures in order to be on the ballot for
Massachusetts voters to vote on in 2020. See Press Release, The Massachusetts Right to Repair
Coalition, Needed Update of MA Right to Repair Law Headed to Ballot (Dec. 5, 2019),
https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/needed-update-of-ma-right-to-repair-lawheaded-to-ballot-300969819.html. The ballot initiative was hotly contested in the lead up to
the November 3, 2020 vote. See Callum Borchers, Mass. Voters Say ‘Yes’ on Question 1, Expanding Access to Car Repair Data, WBUR NEWS (Nov. 3, 2020), https://www.wbur.org/news/2020
/11/03/ballot-question-1-right-to-repair-passes [https://perma.cc/85NP-NCP7] (citing the
amount of money raised for and against Question 1, as well as the misleading advertising
opponents ran in attempt to convince voters to vote “no”).
200. See, e.g., Letter from Rick Habben, Safety Compliance Eng’r, Wahl Clipper Corp., to
David Harris, Rep., Ill. Gen. Assembly (Apr. 17, 2018), https://www.documentcloud.org
/documents/4446374-Wahl-Opposition-Illinois.html [https://perma.cc/8TCZ-SYHK].
201. See, e.g., UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 538 (2005);
18 U.S.C. § 1839(3).
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cern, the original Massachusetts act and, correspondingly, the
MOU state that “[n]othing in this chapter shall be construed to
202
require a manufacturer to divulge a trade secret.” No provision
in the new amendments qualifies this exception. Hence, broad
claims could be made that most or all information related to or
embedded in the telematics system is a trade secret, in which case
the manufacturers are under no legal obligation to provide access
203
to such information. This exception could thus diminish the effectiveness of the new amendments.
This Article’s response to this argument is two-fold. First, to be
classified as a “trade secret,” the information must meet the applicable statutory requirements, including that the owner has taken
204
reasonable measures to keep the information secret. We have
previously posited that a plausible argument could be made that
when information is readily shared with authorized dealers (and
their repair personnel) all over the country, the owner has not tak205
en such reasonable measures. Among other things, even where
manufacturers have entered into confidentiality agreements with
their authorized dealers, it is unclear whether the repair personnel
of these authorized dealers have, in turn, entered into similar
agreements with their employers. Unfortunately, this examination
of how a trade secret is kept a secret would likely only be undertak206
en in a legal proceeding. As we have noted previously, independent repair shops may not have the means to initiate litigation to
challenge how manufacturers are keeping their trade secrets con207
fidential.
And, current case law is not necessarily on the side of repair. In
fact, federal case law from the Eighth Circuit holds that
“[r]easonable efforts to maintain secrecy need not be overly ex208
travagant, and absolute secrecy is not required.” In this particular
case, Rolls Royce had entered into confidentiality agreements with

202. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93K, § 3 (2019). “Trade Secret” is defined in a broad manner
in section 1.
203. For the likelihood of such an argument brought by car manufacturers, see Matt
Murphy, Bill Filed to Prevent Skirting Right-to-Repair Law, METRO W. DAILY NEWS (Sept. 18,
2018), https://www.metrowestdailynews.com/news/20180918/bill-filed-to-prevent-skirtingright-to-repair-law [https://perma.cc/GN9W-LBQ8] (noting that in the negotiations for the
original Massachusetts law, the “trade secret” status of telematics systems was actually the
reason behind automakers insisting on exempting telematics from the scope of the law).
204. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 (1985).
205. Grinvald & Tur-Sinai, supra note 20, at 123.
206. Id. (“Unfortunately, repair shops that do not have information supplied to them
due to the manufacturers’ assertion of a trade secret exemption may not have the means to
initiate litigation challenging this assertion.”).
207. Id.
208. AvidAir Helicopter Supply, Inc. v. Rolls-Royce Corp., 663 F.3d 966, 974 (8th Cir.
2011).
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its authorized repair centers and shared repair documents that
209
contained a legend indicating confidential information. The
court held that these were reasonable efforts to maintain what
Rolls Royce claimed to be trade secrets, notwithstanding that the
210
alleged trade secrets were accessed through other channels. Similarly, in the Ford v. Autel litigation discussed above, the district
court refused to dismiss Ford’s trade secret claim on the pleadings,
ruling that by disclosing that it only shares its trade secrets with authorized dealers, Ford sufficiently alleged it took reasonable efforts
211
to maintain their secrecy.
Given that “reasonable efforts” are subject to judicial interpretation, we would urge judges to look beyond superficial attempts at
confidentiality to the reality of the efforts. This means judges
should not only look at the confidentiality agreements that the
manufacturers have in place with their authorized networks, but
also look at how, if at all, manufacturers monitor and enforce these
agreements to ensure their trade secrets remain a secret. This is
similar to what judges do where allegations of “naked licensing”
212
are made in trademark litigation. Where a trademark is licensed,
the owner has an obligation to monitor the ongoing quality of the
213
products which are being sold under their trademark. While
judges look for quality control clauses in licensing agreements,
they also look at evidence surrounding what steps the licensors
214
took to monitor and enforce the agreements.
The second prong of this Article’s response to the potential that
manufacturers would assert an overly broad trade secrecy claim is
to preempt the problem by either deleting the current provision in
215
the vehicle repair act that exempts trade secrets altogether or replacing it with a more nuanced provision that includes an appropriate carve-out for diagnostic information. The Repair Association
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Ford Motor Co. v. Autel US Inc., No. 14-13760, 2015 WL 5729067, at *7–9 (E.D.
Mich. Sept. 30, 2015).
212. See, e.g., Yellowbook Inc. v. Brandeberry, 708 F.3d 837, 846 (6th Cir. 2013) (“Under
trademark law, where a licensor does not exercise reasonable quality control over a licensee,
the mark is deemed abandoned due to the ‘naked licensing.’ ”).
213. See, e.g., Tumblebus Inc. v. Cranmer, 399 F.3d 754, 764 (6th Cir. 2005) (stating that
naked licensing occurs when a trademark owner fails to maintain quality control over a licensee’s use of the mark such that “the mark can no longer provide ‘a meaningful assurance
of quality.’ ”).
214. See, e.g., Hokto Kinoko Co. v. Concord Farms, Inc., 738 F.3d 1085, 1098 (9th Cir.
2013) (“[T]he licensor may establish adequate quality control by demonstrating a close
working relationship between the licensor and the licensee.”).
215. Cf. An Act to Amend Section 1793.03 of the Civil Code, Relating to Consumer Warranties, Assemb. B. 1163, 2019–2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019) (proposing not to include a
trade secrets exception in a California right to repair bill in regard to consumer electronics).
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recently proposed model legislation that included a similar provi216
sion in the context of consumer electronics. Section 5(a) to the
model legislation provides: “Nothing in this Act shall be construed
to require an original equipment manufacturer to divulge a trade
secret to an owner or an independent service provider except as
necessary to provide documentation, parts, and tools on fair and
217
reasonable terms.” The Massachusetts repair act could similarly
treat information related to diagnostics, maintenance, or repair as
information that cannot be protected as trade secrets and, therefore, is subject to the provisions of the act mandating access. Arguably, if Massachusetts or any other state were to adopt this language, the law could be perceived as modifying trade secret law.
Yet, given that trade secret law is both state and federal, states
should not shy away from regulating what should (or should not),
218
in fact, be a trade secret.
B. Ownership of Data Claims
Another challenge to the right to repair could be that mandating manufacturers to provide access to telematic data conflicts with
their ownership of such data.
This argument does not have a solid legal basis. While data are
subject to a complex set of regulations, including privacy and security regulations, they are largely free from property rights.219 Under
U.S. copyright law, for instance, while the original “selection, coordination, and arrangement” of data could be the subject of copyright protection, the underlying data are never protected by copy220
right and may be freely copied. Similarly, whereas personal

216. For discussion, see Grinvald & Tur-Sinai, supra note 20, at 120–22.
217. Model State Right-to-Repair Law, REPAIR ASS’N § 5(a) (July 24, 2018), https:
//repair.org/s/Right-to-repair-Model-state-law-7-24-18.docx
[https://perma.cc/MTK5LYKD].
218. Until recently, trade secret protection relied solely on state law. Sharon K. Sandeen
& Christopher B. Seaman, Toward a Federal Jurisprudence of Trade Secret Law, 32 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 829, 833 (2017) (“The May 11, 2016 enactment of the DTSA created a federal
civil cause of action for trade secret misappropriation for the first time. For over 175 years,
state law governed civil trade secret principles in the U.S . . . .”). In 2016, Congress enacted
the Defend Trade Secrets Act, Pub. L. No. 114–153, 130 Stat. 376 (2016) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 18, 28, and 34 U.S.C.), but the legislation does not
preempt or displace state law. 18 U.S.C. § 1838 (Supp. 2018). This means that state-based
definitions of a trade secret (either through legislation or through judicial interpretation)
can continue to coexist with a federal definition. Sandeen & Seaman, supra, at 905 (noting
that on its face, the federal definition appears to be narrower in how it defines “information”).
219. See, e.g., Lothar Determann, No One Owns Data, 70 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 5 (2018).
220. Feist Publ’ns v. Rural Telephone Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 359 (1991).
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property laws could protect physical manifestations of information
221
(like traffic signs), they do not protect the information itself.
Most importantly, even if data were subject to property rights, in
the case of diagnostics data created by a vehicle, it would make
much more sense to allocate such rights to the vehicle owner rather than to the manufacturer of the vehicle. The vehicle creates
the data in the course of its use by the owner. There would be no
data if the owner did not use the vehicle. The fact that this data is
transmitted to the manufacturer in real time, just because the latter designed the car to do so, should not create an ownership attachment between the manufacturer and such data.
Finally, even if it were true that manufacturers owned diagnostics data transmitted via telematics systems, it would not mean that
legislation could not mandate them to provide others with access
to such data. Property rights are often subject to various legal exceptions and limitations predicated on the need to enable access
to other parties. Consider, for instance, copyright’s fair use doc222
trine or the concept of real property easements. As demonstrated
by this Article’s analysis, there is clearly a need to ensure vehicle
owners and independent mechanics can access diagnostic infor223
mation.
C. Safety Concerns with Open and Connected Software
As part of their objection to the call for greater access to
telematics, manufacturers could also raise safety and security concerns. Safety concerns are not unique to the telematics scenario.
Arguments based on safety and quality of repair have been raised
before in the context of the right to repair cars, 224 as well as other
225
consumer products. There is nothing exclusive to the telematics
scenario that increases the safety risks associated with car repairs.
Generally speaking, in a competitive repair market, consumers
could switch to alternative repair services, including ones offered
by the original manufacturer or its authorized agents, in case their

221. See Determann, supra note 219, at 13. While this is not the focus of this paper, we
should note, in brief, that we generally find this current legal regime justified from a policy
perspective.
222. For copyright’s fair use doctrine, see 17 U.S.C. § 107. For a definition of an easement, see Marvin M. Brandt Revocable Tr. v. United States. 572 U.S. 93 (2014) (“An easement is
a nonpossessory right to enter and use land in the possession of another and obligates the
possessor not to interfere with the uses authorized by the easement.”).
223. See infra Section I.C & Part III.
224. See, e.g., Newman, supra note 91 (presenting the argument that enabling access to
car code could result in making cars dangerous to drive).
225. See Grinvald & Tur-Sinai, supra note 20, at 122–23.
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independent repair shop does not provide a high-quality service.
Absent any concrete market failures, the invisible hand of the market can presumably be trusted in this context. Most importantly,
the more the original manufacturers support repair businesses rather than fighting them, the better the quality of repairs is likely to
be. Providing reasonable access to available diagnostic and repair
information (as well as diagnostic tools, training, etc.) is a crucial
component in mitigating any safety concerns associated with third
party repairs.
The only unique challenge associated with telematics-based diagnostics seems to be the need to ensure data is transmitted wire226
lessly in a safe way. Yet, this challenge arises out of the actual
switch from OBD ports to telematics-based diagnostics, a step taken
by the manufacturers themselves. There is clearly a need to continually enhance security measures employed in connection with
227
transmission of data from and to cars. Yet this does not contradict enabling secured access to some portions of the car’s data for
certain sets of approved users—in this case, access to diagnostic data for third party repairers authorized by the vehicle owner.
D. Looking into the Future: Remote Repairs
One of the more interesting challenges to a right to repair cars
will come from the future of repairs: wireless and remote repairs.
Instead of sending notices to their users to bring their cars into an
authorized dealer for a software repair,228 manufacturers will simply
“push” the repair to the cars without the need for users to do any229
thing. Tesla has been the pioneer on this front with “over-the-air”
230
software repairs. In fact, with autonomous vehicles just on the
horizon, remote repairs will likely become a necessity. “After all, if
you don’t want to be bothered driving the car, you’re not likely to
231
want to waste time taking it in to the dealership for a fix, either.”
226. See, e.g., MCQUINN & CASTRO, supra note 75, at 17–20 (discussing the various privacy
concerns).
227. See generally Kessler, supra note 2.
228. See John R. Quain, With Benefits – and Risks – Software Updates Are Coming to the Car,
DIGITAL TRENDS (Oct. 29, 2018), https://www.digitaltrends.com/cars/over-the-air-softwareupdates-cars-pros-cons [https://perma.cc/DD3W-LBB9] (“According to NHTSA, today only
62 percent of recalled cars ever get repaired–even after owners have been sent multiple notices. OTA could eliminate many of these compliance problems, and save millions of dollars
in maintenance work in the process.”).
229. See Alex Brisbourne, Tesla’s Over-the-Air Fix: Best Example Yet of the Internet of Things?,
(Feb.
2014),
https://www.wired.com/insights/2014/02/teslas-air-fix-best-ex
WIRED
ample-yet-internet-things [https://perma.cc/L6V9-FVNP].
230. See generally id.
231. See Quain, supra note 228.
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The question will be whether manufacturers are successful in
maintaining a monopoly over these remote repairs in all situations.
The challenge that will likely be raised to allowing independent
repair shops access to push remote repairs will be similar to other
arguments discussed in this Part. Yet the competitive need to allow
an open market for car repairs—either in a physical shop or remotely—does not change as technology updates. In addition, if the
experience with Tesla is any indication, there will hopefully be
232
consumer backlash over attempts to monopolize all repairs.
CONCLUSION
The discussion in this Article demonstrates how the law can, and
should, be adapted to keep pace with technological developments.
Currently, there is a risk that newly enhanced technological abilities could enable manufacturers to evade their legal duties and
suppress competition in the market for repair services. In just a few
years since the passage of the 2012 Massachusetts law and the 2014
MOU, car manufacturers have utilized legal ambiguity around
telematics to skirt their obligations in a manner that severely
threatens competition in the market for car repairs. There are
good reasons to believe that this situation is only going to get worse
in the near future. To maintain the spirit of the law and secure
consumer choice with respect to car repair, adaptations must take
place.
Altogether, we believe a multi-pronged and multi-agency approach is needed to provide for an effective right to repair cars, as
well as other consumer products. We support the new Massachusetts law that requires car manufacturers to provide third parties
with reasonable access to diagnostic and repair information transmitted via telematics systems. Hopefully, now that the new law has
passed in Massachusetts, the MOU will also be updated to include
similar provisions.
Moreover, due to the potential for deceptive advertising and the
ability of manufacturers to take advantage of their relationships
with consumers, this area should be closely examined and possibly
regulated. Manufacturers’ control over telematics systems for purposes of advertising their services and products threatens consumer choice and competition in repair markets. We hope the FTC’s

232. See Mike Moffitt, The Thing About Owning a Tesla No One Talks About—Nightmarish
Repair Delays, SF GATE (May 28, 2019, 11:30 AM), https://www.sfgate.com/cars/article/teslarepair-wait-time-complaints-electric-car-13796037.php [https://perma.cc/ZQ5P-RKFV].
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ongoing investigation into the repair industry will produce concrete actions in this respect.
Finally, we should not be concerned simply with consumer protection laws and policies but also federal intellectual property laws.
As the discussion in this Article shows, without due attention paid
to intellectual property laws, an effective right to repair cannot be
implemented.

